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“The Chattanooga Campaign: Death of The Confederacy” by Josh Smith,
is submitted for the fulfillment of Master of Arts degree in History from Minnesota
State University Mankato in June 2013. The purpose of this work is to
demonstrate the importance of the Chattanooga Campaign. The campaign was
important to the war because the Confederate loss opened the deeper Southern
states to the advancing Union Armies. Due to the ineptitudes and failures of their
leader, Braxton Bragg, the Army of Tennessee was forced to relinquish their hold
on east Tennessee. Bragg’s failures were equally matched by the
insubordination he received from his subordinate officers, Leonidas Polk, William
Hardee, and James Longstreet. These men failed to work together and
consequently Tennessee was lost to the Union. Chattanooga was a major rail
hub and industrial city in the South. Its loss was devastating to the South
because it could not afford to lose the important commodities that the city
offered. By examining the official records, diaries, memoirs, and secondary
sources, it becomes clear that Chattanooga was more than just a city to the
South, it was their last bastion of hope that they could win the war. This thesis
aims to illustrate the importance of this campaign by showing what the South lost
and North gained from the campaign. Throughout the year 1863, the South had
many devastating losses and Chattanooga was the final one. Bragg and his army
had failed during the campaign, and the once dominant Confederacy began to
crumble.

Introduction
In the fall of 1863, General Braxton Bragg and his Army of Tennessee
retreated from their entrenchments around Chattanooga, Tennessee, and into
Northern Georgia where they spent the fall and winter of 1863-64. This marked
the final campaign for Bragg as commander of the Army of Tennessee, and it
was an utter disaster. The loss of Chattanooga opened the “heart” of the
Confederacy to the Union Army and was the final blow to the Confederacy in
1863, following the losses at Gettysburg and Vicksburg earlier that year. The
Chattanooga Campaign had been the last chance the Confederacy stood against
the Union Army, and it failed. With Bragg’s defeat the Union Army could
penetrate deeper into the Southern states.
Chattanooga lies in a valley below Lookout Mountain and Missionary
Ridge and along the Tennessee River, which separates the city and Lookout
Mountain. The town itself was industrial as well as a rail hub for the Confederacy,
with railroads that led from Virginia to western Tennessee and northern
Mississippi. Almost every major railroad in the South ran through the town,
making it a vitally important town during the war. With the lack of railroads in the
Confederacy, the loss of such an important rail town created further difficulties
supplying and moving troops.1
Not only was the city itself important, but the area in which Chattanooga
sat held importance as well. Chattanooga lies in the southeastern corner of
1

Peter Cozzens, Shipwreck of Their hopes: Battles for Chattanooga (Urbana and Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1994), 15-17.
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Tennessee, which held vital farmland in the valley of the Appalachian Mountains.
The valleys provided food for the Confederacy and the mountains provided
protection to the deeper parts of the South from the Union Armies. Cities, such
as Chattanooga, were where food was processed and shipped all throughout the
Southern states. The city only had a population of twenty-five hundred, but it was
the third largest rail hub in the South, behind only Atlanta and Richmond. This
greatly increased the importance of Chattanooga and East Tennessee to the
Confederacy.2
The Appalachian Mountains run along the East Coast of the United States
from the Northeast to the Southeast, and provided much of the Confederacy with
protection from Union invaders. The only way through these mountains was the
rivers and small trails that had been carved out by early settlers. Chattanooga
sits adjacent to the Tennessee River. This made Chattanooga a direct target for
the Union Armies once Abraham Lincoln and his generals set their sights on
penetrating the lower Southern states. In taking Chattanooga, the Union Army
broke past the mountain chain that protected the states like Alabama and
Georgia.
To the Confederacy, Chattanooga was more than just a city: it was the last
bastion of hope that Georgia, Alabama, and other lower Southern states were
protected from the Union. After the defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the
Confederacy lost support both at home and abroad. The walls were closing in on

2
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the fledgling country and the Confederacy could not stand to lose any more vital
cities, especially ones that protected the deep South and supplied its army.
Tennessee comes in contact with most of the Confederate states, making
it an important state to control. This was something that both the Confederate
and Union governments realized. Tennessee had access to rivers, railroads, and
food supplies that connected and supplied the South. From early on Tennessee
was a battleground, and its fate helped decide that of the South. The trouble with
Tennessee was that it was not unanimous in support for the Confederacy.
Throughout the entire state, largely in Middle and Eastern Tennessee, there were
pro-Union factions. Because of this Tennessee was one of the last states to
leave the Union, seceding in May 1861.3
Eastern Tennessee was important to the campaign because of its rich
farmland,and because it divided the Northern troops in Kentucky from those in
Tennessee. Eastern Tennessee was key in keeping General William Rosecrans,
General Don Carlos Buell, and General Ambrose Burnside from linking up and
marching on the deeper South. In order to keep the Union Army at bay, the
eastern part of the state had to be held. The Confederacy had already lost large
chunks of the state and it was important to hold onto what they still had, but this
was easier said than done.4
The Confederate government knew that it needed to hold the eastern
portion of Tennessee in order to have continued success as a country, but did
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not want to put the same effort into it as they did the war in the East. To many in
the Confederacy, the war in the East was important to them because they
believed that was where the war was to be won or lost. General Robert E. Lee
was the believed strongly in this. He constantly requested troops from the West
but never once offered or allowed troops to be taken from his command to the
West. Lee even proposed leaving only a small token force in the West and
sending Bragg’s troops to Virginia.To Lee the West supplied manpower and
nothing more. He, along with others, believed that the East was superior to the
West. Furthermore: both capitol cites were in the East, which insured that both
governments focused a majority of their attention on that front.5
During his time as General of the Army of Tennessee, Braxton Bragg dealt
with insubordination from numerous officers. Bragg was constantly questioned
and disobeyed by his junior staff. Leonidas Polk, William Hardee, and later
James Longstreet were some of his main foes. They believed, due to his
blunders throughout the campaign, that Bragg was unsuitable to lead the Army of
Tennessee. Though Bragg had been disliked beforehand, it escalated during the
Chattanooga Campaign. His constant retreating, indecisiveness, and blaming
others did not help his case. The constant undermining of Bragg had a direct
effect on his command. How can one expect an army to properly function let
alone win a campaign when the leadership is constantly undermined? It is
astonishing that Bragg and his men even won a single contest, and it is no
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surprise that they lost vast territory in eastern Tennessee with hardly a shot
fired.6
In less than a few months Bragg and the Army of Tennessee retreated all
the way back into Chattanooga from Murfreesboro, and eventually into northern
Georgia after the failed siege of Chattanooga. General Rosecrans had effectively
pushed the Confederate army from eastern Tennessee, often without firing a
shot. The only glimmer of hope Bragg gave the Confederacy during the entire
campaign was the victory at the Battle of Chickamauga in North Georgia. It was
not enough to save Chattanooga or the rest of eastern Tennessee. Eventually
Bragg conceded Chattanooga and retreated into Dalton, Georgia where he was
replaced by General Joseph E. Johnston.7
The campaign was the last action for General Bragg, and it perfectly
illustrated what disunion and disloyalty to leaders can do. During the entire
campaign Bragg made poor decisions and dealt with disloyalty from Polk and
Hardee. The fight for Chattanooga and East Tennessee was the last chance for
the Confederacy to regain momentum in the war and they failed. After
Chattanooga fell it was only a matter of time before the Confederacy
surrendered.
There were really only three major battles during the entire campaign,
which lasted from spring to fall 1863. The three important engagements were
Chickamauga, Lookout Mountain, and Missionary Ridge with Missionary Ridge
and Lookout Mountain being part of the Battle for Chattanooga. What is most
6
7
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interesting about this entire campaign is there was little-to-no action until the
Army of Tennessee retreated into Chattanooga, and then subsequently into
North Georgia. The inability of the Army of Tennessee to stop the Union caused
problems for Bragg. The problems came from the Confederate government and
his subordinate officers.8
Chattanooga was the last strong defense for the lower Southern states,
and it is hard to comprehend how Jefferson Davis and other Confederate leaders
did not place more emphasis on this region. The Union Army exposed some of
the South’s valuable industrial areas by breaking through the Appalachian
Mountains. In Augusta and Atlanta, Georgia, there were gun powder and
munitions manufacturers that were critical to the South’s war efforts.9
The Union needed to get at the deeper areas in the South, and bring the
war to the homes of those people. The most important aspect of the Chattanooga
Campaign for the Union was the opening of the Appalachian Mountains and
North Georgia. If the Union Army had not broken Bragg’s siege and established a
strong foothold in the area, the events in the following year, 1864, would be
postponed. The most crucial event following the Union victory at Chattanooga
was Sherman’s March to the Sea. By establishing the Union Army in the area,
Sherman was able to focus on his next goal, bringing Hell on earth to the
population of Georgia.10
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After close examination, it is clear that the Chattanooga Campaign was
important for both the Confederacy and the Union. This campaign illustrated the
skill of the Union leaders, while showing the ineptitude and refusal of the
Southern leaders in the Army of Tennessee to work together. It is easy to say
that the Union was superior in numbers and that is how they won, but what this
campaign does well is illustrate how leadership can make or break an army. If
Polk, Hardee, or Longstreet had listened to Bragg, then the outcome of the
campaign might have been different.
Many scholars believe the only way for the South to have won the war
was to be defensive. By doing this, the Confederacy could have held off the
Union which had huge advantages in industrial capacity and population. The
geography of the South was well-suited for a defensive war. The Appalachian
Mountain chain runs through much of the region and creates a natural barrier.
Another advantage for the South in a defensive war was its coastal defenses.
The majority of the United States Naval forts were located in Confederate
territory, and naturally when the states left the Union those forts became part of
the Confederacy. Finally, by fighting a defensive war the South could use its
army more efficiently. A defensive war needed far fewer soldiers than an
offensive one. This was critical because the South had a much smaller
population than the North. The only problem with a defensive war is the

8

morale.The hardest part about fighting a defensive war is always receiving the
attacks and never giving them, which tests the morale of soldiers.11
Had the South stuck to its original plan of a defensive war, the outcome
could have been different. That is not to say the South would have won, but it
does mean that their best chances lay in defending their homeland rather than
seeking to prove their military superiority by invading the North. The North knew
the South’s best chance was a defensive war and so they sought to bring the
Southern states to their knees by slowly strangling them from sea to land. This
was known as the “Anaconda Plan.”12
By Spring 1863 the war still favored the South, but some of the
momentum had shifted toward the North. The South had still won the majority of
the encounters, but the North had reached a crucial stalemate with the South at
Antietam in late 1862. The Battle of Antietam was the beginning of turning the
tide in the war. General Kirby Smith’s failed invasion of Kentucky also favored the
North. By the time 1863 rolled around the South had been ejected from Northern
soil twice. By late 1863 the war was completely in the North’s hands. Union
Armies had won crucial victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. While one of the
South’s greatest losses during that year came in the loss of General Thomas
“Stonewall” Jackson at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Though the South won the
battle, friendly fire killed one of the war’s best generals.13
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The losses suffered by the Confederacy during 1863 are important for
showing how the war turned in favor of the North. Up until this point the South
had dominated the war. After 1863 it was only a matter of time before the war
would end. The South had lost too much and could no longer support a war of
this magnitude. The loss of Chattanooga meant the loss of railroads and
manufacturing, which the South could not afford to lose more of. If Bragg and his
men had stopped Rosecrans and his army, the Confederacy would have been
able to hold on for longer.
When the Army of Tennessee retreated back into Middle Tennessee in
Fall 1862, the Union Army was beginning its plan of strangling the Southern
states into submission. New Orleans had already fallen and Union soldiers slowly
made their way up the Mississippi River and cut the Confederacy in two. During
early spring 1862 the war had taken a drastically bloody turn. The Battle of Shiloh
took the lives of 23,000 soldiers. Shiloh was the bloodiest two days in United
States history at the time and awakened people to the severity of the war. Shiloh
would stand as the bloodiest two days in the war until Chickamauga. The North
could withstand the severe losses but the South could not. Battles like Shiloh
earned General Ulysses S. Grant the nickname “The Butcher.” Grant was one of
the generals who helped turn the tide of the war in the North’s favor. Along with
General William T. Sherman, Grant gave the Union much needed victories in the
West and later in the East.14

14
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The South enjoyed great success against the North throughout the first
half of the war. Starting with the Battle at Manassas (First Bull Run) in 1861, the
Southern army proved they were a force to be reckoned with and the realization
that this war was not going to end in a few weeks began to sink in for both
armies. One of the critical issues facing the Union was the leadership of its army.
At the outbreak of the war the United States Army was commanded by Winfield
Scott who was aging and could not ride his horse without assistance. His tenure
as commander was short lived, and in November 1861 the army came under the
command of General George B. McClellan.15
General McClellan was the complete antithesis of Winfield Scott: he was
young and often compared to Napoleon due in large part to his ego. McClellan
was a good general, but was cautious to the point that at times President Lincoln
demanded that he go to battle. McClellan fought only when he believed that
victory could be achieved and that his men were in capable condition to fight. He
became notorious for drilling and camping. Though he did have success on the
battlefield, most of McClellan’s tenure as commander was spent in camp.
Eventually Lincoln had it with the general and sought to replace him. Lincoln
knew he needed a general who was willing to fight and not stay in camp
constantly asking for more men, supplies, and time.16
The next Union Army commander was Henry Halleck, who served as
commander from July 1862 to March 1863. Halleck was placed in command after
the Peninsular Campaign. Lincoln hoped that Halleck would be more assertive in
15
16
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going to battle than McClellan, but he was wrong. Halleck was a planner just as
his predecessor had been. Though he experienced success at the Battle of
Antietam, his unwillingness to pursue Lee and his army displeased Lincoln. In the
end Halleck was no better suited as General of the Union army than McClellan
had been in Lincoln’s eyes. Lincoln was still looking for a leader who would fight.
He need not look further than to the war in the West where Ulysses S. Grant was
winning battles and making a name for himself.17
Ulysses S. Grant commanded in the West during the early parts of the
war. He experienced success at Shiloh and Vicksburg before he was made the
General-in-Chief of the Union army in 1863. It was at the siege of Vicksburg
where Grant earned the nickname “Unconditional Surrender” Grant, after he
refused to accept anything less from the Confederate troops inhabiting the fort.
Grant was the fighter Lincoln had been seeking. Grant was different from other
generals due to his understanding of what it took to win the war. Grant, with the
help of Sherman, sought to bring “Hell on earth” to the states that seceded from
the Union. He wanted to punish the South for their actions and sought make the
war as brutal as he could. Grant would stopped at nothing to win the war, and
was exactly what Lincoln was looking for in a general. He was also exactly what
the Union needed to win.18
The leadership of the Confederate army was, at least in the beginning,
better than that of the North. At the outset of the war the Confederacy did not
have a formal General-in-Chief, but it did have many qualified individuals for the
17
18
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job. P.G.T. Beauregard, Robert E. Lee, Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, and others
were more than qualified to be in charge of the army. President Jefferson Davis
was in charge of the Confederate Army in the beginning and took advice in large
part from Robert E. Lee. Davis, a veteran of the Mexican-American War, believed
himself more than capable to command. Davis took advice from Lee and even
Bragg, after the latter was removed from command.19
Many of the South’s generals were commissioned in the United States
military prior to the outbreak of the war. Robert E. Lee was even offered the job
of General-in-Chief of the Union Army before he joined the Confederacy. His
home state of Virginia seceded and consequently he resigned from the United
States Army and joined the Confederacy. Lee placed his home state before the
Union, like so many of his fellow Confederate comrades.
Lee was not officially declared the Commander-in-Chief of the
Confederate army until January 1865, although he had been in charge of
arguably the most important branch, the Army of Northern Virginia, prior. The
promotion was rather late, since the war ended a few months later. Unlike the
North, the South’s leaders were better prepared for the war. The Union leaders
would become superior later in the war, but, as stated before, the initial
advantage lay with the Confederacy.20
The largest blows to the South came in the loss of great generals, like
Stonewall Jackson, and the infighting between commanders. What Northern
generals did better than their Southern counterparts was work together. The only
19
20
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way to win a war is to work together and that is exactly what the South did not
do. Looking at the Chattanooga Campaign makes it clearly evident that this was
one of the South’s biggest problems. When it came to one of the most important
times during the war, not even those fighting together could put aside their
differences to work for a common goal. Ultimately, this cost the South.
Almost as soon as the Civil War ended, people began writing about it.
People wanted to write about their experiences, the outcomes, justifications, and
countless other topics on the war. To this day the American Civil War is one of
the most written about topics in American history. Throughout the years following
the war, the way it has been examined has changed.
The first writings about the Chattanooga Campaign came from participants
such as generals and other field commanders who wrote accounts of the battles
and campaigns. These are an excellent primary source when looking at battles,
but it is important to read these accounts through a “lens.” This is because in
many of the accounts those writing were trying to explain and exonerate their
actions on the battlefield. A prime example of this comes from Rosecrans after
the Union loss at Chickamauga and their subsequent retreat back into
Chattanooga. In his accounts, General Rosecrans tries to explain that his actions
were just. At the same time he attempts to place blame elsewhere. According to
Rosecrans, “It is proper to observe that the battle of Chickamauga was
absolutely necessary to secure our concentration and cover Chattanooga. It was
fought in a country covered with woods and undergrowth and wholly unknown to
us.” These two sentences show Rosecrans justifying the battle and the loss.

14

Nowhere in this document does he mention his order that opened a hole in the
Union line that effectively lost them the battle. In examining other battle accounts
from General George Thomas and others, it becomes clear that Rosecrans was
at fault for the loss.21
Historians began to write about the great leaders of the war as the number
of surviving veterans dwindled. Books were written about Lee, Grant, Sherman,
and many other major and minor military leaders of the war, including leaders of
the Chattanooga Campaign. There have been books written about Bragg,
Longstreet, and General George H. Thomas, who came to be known as the
“Rock of Chickamauga.” These works show the greatness of these leaders to a
generation who never knew them. In Rock of Chickamauga: The Life of General
George H. Thomas, Freeman Cleaves writes, “ He had put on his uniform and
had taken his oath. Solid and immovable he would not desert.” In this sentence
Cleaves shows the true character of Thomas. Cleaves is making it clear to the
reader that Thomas was a good and noble man who stood by his commitments.
These books began appearing in the 1930s and 40s, when there were not many
people from the war still alive.22
It did not take long for historians to exhaust the subject of leaders in the
war, so they moved on. The next focus was on the individual branches of the
Union and Confederate Armies. They took a look at the smaller divisions in both

21
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armies. Historians had already looked at the armies in a larger context, and now
it was time for them to examine the smaller and less written about divisions.
For the Chattanooga Campaign both the Confederate and Union Armies
have been discussed in detail. In 1998 Woodworth, in Six Armies in Tennessee,
examines the fight for Eastern Tennessee by both the Confederacy and Union.
Woodworth is trying to gain an understanding of how and why the campaign
played out as it did. According to Woodworth, “The struggle for Tennessee
greatly influenced the outcome of the war. Coming on top of the better known
victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the Union’s successful culmination of
these operations left the Confederacy in desperate condition.” Woodworth clearly
places great emphasis on the campaigns in Tennessee and the armies that
fought them. The goal of works like this is to show that the war was won and lost
by more than just the large armies fighting in Virginia.23
Autumn of Glory by Thomas Lawrence Connelly and The Shipwreck of
Their Hopes: The Battles for Chattanooga by Peter Cozzens are examples of
other books focusing on smaller branches fighting in the war. Each of these
books examines individual components of the Confederate and Union Armies,
and how they played a crucial role in the outcome of the Chattanooga and
Eastern Tennessee campaigns. These works show the importance of the
smaller divisions and their leaders in the army. “The Chattanooga Campaign also
cemented the triumvirate that would win the war: Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan,”

23
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writes Peter Cozzens.24 Many important generals gained recognition for their
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accomplishments during the Chattanooga Campaign.
How The North Won: A Military History of The Civil War by Herman
Hattaway and Archer Jones is a prime example of where historians were headed
by the 1980s. By this time the South had been immortalized as the glorious
underdog taking on the mighty Union, and works like Hattaway and Jones’
sought to debunk that myth. They argue that the Confederate leaders were inept
and lucky more than they were actually skilled. The best example of this comes
in their description of the Seven Days Battle. Many historians see this as one of
the most daring battles fought in the war, but Hattaway and Jones view it as a
matter of sheer luck for the Confederacy. “The southern effort during the
‘campaign will always,’ Douglas Freeman wrote, ‘remain a tragic monument to
defective staff work.”25 Hattaway and Jones also contend that it was the Union
that had the superior leadership and won because of it, rather than superior
numbers and supplies.26
In the case of the Chattanooga Campaign, Hattaway and Jones were not
wrong: it was the Southern leadership that ultimately doomed the entire
campaign. Apart from General Rosecrans actions at Chickamauga, the Union
Army’s leadership was greatly superior to that of the Confederacy. Works like
these are important, because they challenge what everyone else was saying

24
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about the subject. These works properly point out that there are many reasons
and opinions how and why the North won the war.
Examining the lives of individual soldiers became the method of study for
historians in the 1990s. We are better able to gain an understanding of war
through the eyes of the common soldier. Books like Shipwreck of Their Hopes
and Autumn of Glory make it clear that disdain for Bragg not only came from
Hardee, Polk, and Longstreet, but also the common soldiers. It was hard for
Bragg’s men to have faith in him after he had failed them so many times. In
Autumn of Glory Connelly states, “By mid-January Bragg’s popularity and the
army’s morale seemed at a new low. The outcry over Kentucky had not abated,
and after Murfreesboro, dislike of Bragg was widespread in the army.”27
Repeatedly the Army of Tennessee had prepared to face the Union army of the
Cumberland, but at the last minute Bragg decided to fall back to a supposedly
better position. At this point Bragg’s popularity within the army was shrinking
even lower and morale was going along with it. This allowed Hardee, Polk, and
Longstreet to undermine Bragg more easily.28
Studying soldiers lives is important. As are the study of how politics,
culture, and even geography played a role in the war, however examining the
Civil War is about more than just the war itself. Like any other war, the Civil War
affected more than those directly involved. Both Confederate and Union generals
discussed strategy with their respective governments, putting the outcome of the
war largely in the hands of these governments. The war was fought across the
27
28
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country and by people from all different countries, making culture and geography
play a significant role. Geography and politics played an especially crucial role in
the Chattanooga Campaign.
Because Chattanooga lies on a river bend in a valley between part of the
Appalachian Mountain range, the geography of the region is important. The
Confederate Army was able to keep the Union Army under siege at Chattanooga
with a smaller force by stationing artillery and infantry divisions on the
surrounding hills and mountains. This meant that the Union Army had no choice
but to either fight their way out or surrender. They chose to fight. Geography also
played a role in the protection of states like Georgia and Alabama. The
Appalachian Mountains form a barrier that the Union Army had to cross in order
to reach cities like Atlanta. Chattanooga was the perfect place to establish a
foothold in the area because it sits in a valley between the mountains and has
the means, by both river and rail, to be accessible by both men and supplies.29
Though geography played a key role in the Chattanooga Campaign,
nothing was more influential to the campaign than politics. Both the Northern and
Southern governments were in contact and control of much of their respective
armies. This could be good or bad, and in the case of the Army of Tennessee it
was a bad thing.The war in the East preoccupied Jefferson Davis and his war
department, leading Bragg and the Army of Tennessee being of less importance
to the Confederate leaders. They felt that the Eastern armies deserved more
attention than those in the West, because of their supposed importance. The
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importance of the East, as stated earlier, was in large part due to its proximity to
both capital cites, larger population, and the belief that the war would be won or
lost in the East rather than the West. As a result, Davis considered Bragg and the
Army of Tennessee less important to securing a Confederate victory.30
Politics played a role in the Army of Tennessee by way of the junior
officers. Hardee, Polk, and Longstreet sought to remove Bragg from command
by disobeying his orders and writing to Davis about the ineptitude of their leader.
General Hardee went as far as to write Davis about the decision to retire from
Murfreesboro. The General wrote that he agreed with the decision to retire, but
also that he felt compelled to let Davis know that the officers in the Army of
Tennessee felt it was time for Bragg to be relieved of his command. Hardee
stated, “I feel that frankness compels me to say that the general officers, whose
judgment you have invoked, are unanimous in the opinion that change in the
command of this army is necessary.”31 Luckily for Bragg, Davis believed in him
and had no other real options for his successor. Hardee, Polk, and Longstreet
used both military and political means in their attempt to get Bragg ousted as
commander of the army. They wrote to Davis, other generals, and even recorded
the military actions so that Bragg looked inept. In their defense, Bragg did have
many blunders during the campaign, but they were overwhelmingly the result of
something Hardee, Polk, and later Longstreet did or said.32
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When examining any campaign or battle of any war, it is important to look
at all the factors that played into the results. Throughout the war, politics,
geography, and culture played crucial roles. Battles are important to knowing
what happened, but it takes more than military actions to understand why events
transpired as they did. The Chattanooga Campaign is no different in this aspect.
Politics, culture, military strategies, and geography all played crucial roles in the
outcome of this campaign.
This work aims to examine the military events of the Chattanooga
Campaign, while illustrating that the outcome was due to a variety of events.
Chattanooga represented a last lifeline for the Confederacy. The infighting and
ineptitude of the Southern leaders caused one of their last vital cities to fall into
the enemies hands. The goal is to show the importance of Chattanooga to the
South, and that its loss was the beginning of the end. By looking at military
events, political influences, geography, and the all important insubordination by
Bragg’s junior officers, it becomes easier to understand how and why Bragg lost
the campaign.
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Chapter 1: Fall 1862-Summer 1863

Fall 1862 saw General Braxton Bragg and his Army of Tennessee
retreating back into Eastern Tennessee after a failed invasion of Western
Kentucky. In the late fall Bragg, with General Smith, entered Kentucky with
roughly 40,000 men. The invasion took place around Perryville in the western
part of the state. General Kirby Smith believed invading Kentucky would garner
support from its inhabitants, but he was wrong. Instead, Smith and Bragg were
greeted by General Don Carlos Buell and the Union Army. Buell repelled the
Confederate attack by the sheer size of his army. General Kirby Smith believed
the Union was not attacking with their full force, yet the Confederates were still
forced to retreat.33 Many Kentucky residents did not support the rebellion.
According to historian John Keegan, “Kentucky was probably the most borderline
of all the border states, counted by both sides as part of their governed territory
with regiments and large numbers of young men in both their orders for battle.”34
This made the invasion of Kentucky rather difficult for both armies. They had to
be aware of where they were and whom they could trust, which made for a
difficult invasion for the South. Eventually Bragg and his army had to retreat back

33

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of Union and Confederate
Armies (Washington, D.C., 1880-1900), Ser. 1 Vol. XVI pt.2, 959, hereinafter cited as Official
Records.
34
Keegan, 157-158

22

into Tennessee rather shortly after the initial invasion took place. The situation in
Kentucky was not unlike that in Eastern Tennessee.35
Bragg’s army found itself looking to hold Eastern Tennessee after failing in
Kentucky. The Confederacy could not stand to lose any more territory to the
North, especially places that grew valuable food stores. The goal of the Army of
Tennessee was to hold the area around Murfreesboro, and try to retake Knoxville
from the Union Army. By late October 1862 the Army of Tennessee was trying to
mount an offensive that was hastily and poorly planned. The Confederate
government wanted Bragg and his army to maintain their hold on East
Tennessee around Murfreesboro, while planning to attack and recapture
Nashville.36
The first obstacle for the Army of Tennessee to overcome was their lack of
organization. In November Bragg reorganized his army into three corps led by
Leonidas Polk, William Hardee, and Kirby Smith, but by December it would be
dispersed. To bring more balance to Hardee and Polk’s corps, Bragg broke up
Patton Anderson’s division between the two and assigned John Breckenridge’s
division to Hardee. This only brought more confusion to the army. Another cause
for the organizational issues was the entire army was spread out and lacked
cohesion. This was especially true for Bragg’s cavalry. Upon taking over the
Army of Tennessee, Bragg established a new cavalry system. In it, General
Nathan Bedford Forrest, Colonel John Morgan, and Colonel Joseph Wheeler all
commanded a segment of the cavalry with orders to interrupt the Union
35
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communication system. The entire Confederate Cavalry was spread out away
from the army disrupting the Union Army, leaving the Southern Army oblivious to
Union movements.37
According to Union Brigadier-General of Volunteers Thomas J. Wood,
“My people captured last evening a very intelligent negro who belonged to a
Texan Ranger who was killed in the attack on the stockade on the 29th. This
negro gives a very intelligent account of General Forrest's movements for the last
two weeks. He says Forrest left his train at Decatur, in Meigs County, on the
Tennessee River, two weeks ago, since which time he has been roaming around,
hunting for small parties and trains to capture, and subsisting on the country.”38 It
was evident, even to the Union, that the Confederate Cavalry was roaming
around the countryside making the Confederate Army blind to their movements.
Without the cavalry nearby, Bragg had little scouting reports of Rosecrans
movements. This also helped to thin Bragg’s army even more.
By the time Bragg had reentered Tennessee he began making plans to
retake Nashville from the Union. The government and army officials were in favor
of this plan, but Bragg was ill prepared. By October 23 the Confederate Army had
yet to make a move on Nashville and seemed it would not do so any time soon.
At this time Bragg even admitted to the Confederate government that his army
was so unorganized that he could not even estimate its strength. Upon learning
this information the government requested Bragg’s presence in Richmond to
discuss his plans. While away, Bragg left Leonidas Polk in charge with a vague
37
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instruction on how to handle the situation. In his correspondence to Polk, Bragg
sent maps with the instruction to lead as he saw fit.39 This was the only
instruction given. Polk was to take a position he thought desirable. This illustrates
how vague Bragg’s perception of the entire situation was, and how he trusted a
man that he should not have.40
Along with disorganization, Bragg dealt with the lack of supplies that his
men were receiving. By fall 1862 the Army of Tennessee was on the verge of
collapse from sheer lack of necessary supplies. They were poorly fed, and
dressed, and the men were flat out exhausted. Though they were camped on rich
farmland, the Army of Tennessee was essentially starving due to its lack of food.
This was because the majority of crops grown in the area were being shipped to
Lee’s army in Virginia. Essentially Bragg and his men were defending an area in
which they could draw no necessary sustenance. Even clothes and other basic
military essentials were being shipped out of Middle Tennessee to Virginia.
These conditions made for an improperly supplied army, whose morale was only
shrinking.41
The Army of Tennessee was starving, yet their government would not
allocate them proper supplies. Eventually the army resorted to scavenging and
foraging for food, but it did not take long for them to exhaust the region’s supply.
The problem the South faced was the lack of food grown in the region. The food
stores they had were not enough to support both armies and a civilian population
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in the area, and on top of this the government took what food there was away for
disbursement in the Virginia theater.
The situation in the Western Theater was in complete chaos. It was
absolutely irrational that Bragg’s men were starving and half clothed in an area
that could more than adequately supply them. The Confederate government put
so much emphasis on the war in the East, that those fighting in the West suffered
tremendously. This was one of the major downfalls of the entire campaign and
apart from poor leadership, affected the outcome. The Army of Tennessee
always came second to Lee and the armies in the East.
Not until December 31, 1862 did the Union and Confederate Armies
engage in battle at Stones River. Bragg decided to take the defensive and stand
his ground at Murfreesboro. This was a bad decision because the town offered a
poor defense against the Union Army and could be easily flanked, pushing the
Confederates out of the town. Upon entering Murfreesboro, Bragg spread the
army out over a fifty-mile stretch, and formed a defensive line. The line was to
protect and defend the roads leading into the town. Unfortunately for Bragg and
the army, this merely weakened the army as well as threatened to cut off part of
it. Making a successful stand at Murfreesboro was out of the question after Bragg
ordered his men to spread out in such a poorly defensible area.42
William Rosecrans and the Army of the Cumberland opposed Bragg and
the Army of Tennessee. Rosecrans took command for the Union after Major
General Don Carlos Buell was relieved of duty because he did not pursue the
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Confederate Army into Tennessee quickly enough. Shortly after replacing Buell,
Rosecrans was given an opportunity to show his fighting spirit to the leaders in
Washington. Upon learning of the movement of troops from Bragg’s army to
Mississippi, Rosecrans planned to attack the Confederate Army. On December
26, 1862 the Army of the Cumberland left Nashville and headed towards
Murfreesboro.43
The Battle of Stones River lasted from December 31 to January 2 and was
one of the most important battles in Middle Tennessee. The first day of battle the
Confederates pushed the Union right flank back to the Nashville Turnpike. Here
the Union troops were able to hold their ground. After the first day’s fighting,
Bragg believed that the Union Army would retreat and ordered his troops to stay
in place rather than to continue pressing the Union right flank. By the late
afternoon Bragg ordered an attack of the Union left flank by General John
Breckenridge. Breckenridge and his men were nearly successful in breaking the
Union left flank, but were stopped by Union artillery.44
By the end of the first day’s battle, the Army of Tennessee clearly had the
advantage over the Army of the Cumberland. Overnight saw a change in the
momentum of the battle. At the end of the first day’s fighting, the Union Army
fortified themselves into their position on a hill just east of Stones River.
According to Rosecrans’ official report of the battle, their initial goal was to hold
the right flank while the left crossed the river and headed into town that way. “The
plan of the battle was to open on the right and engage enemy sufficiently to hold
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thwarted by the full frontal attack made be the Rebels on the Union right flank.
The strong Confederate attack made Rosecrans change his strategy, and he
decided to reinforce the right wing of his army with his left. Rosecrans and the
Union Army were able to successfully repel the Confederate attacks by doing
this.46
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Fortifications and reinforcements helped lead to a successful second day
for the Union. At 4 A.M. on January 2, Bragg ordered Breckinridge to attack the
Union line. Breckinridge believed this to be a suicidal attempt. Ignoring his
officers pleas, Bragg continued with his plan to attack the well fortified
Rosecrans. The attack was a failure, the Union artillery was able to decimate the
Confederate Army from across Stones River. By the end of the day it was
obvious that the assault had been a failure. Not long after, Bragg realized that the
Army of the Cumberland had been reinforced and the Army of Tennessee stood
no chance against a reinforced and well fortified enemy. By January 3 Bragg
ordered the retreat from Murfreesboro and into Tullahoma.48 A couple days after
the attack and retreat Bragg wrote, “Unable to dislodge the enemy from his
intrenched position, and learning of re-enforcements to him I withdrew from his
front night before last.”49 Bragg believed that he stood no chance against
Rosecrans in his current position, so he ordered the retreat.
The Battle of Stones River was only the first of the losses for the
Confederacy during the campaign. Additionally, this battle provides a good
depiction of how superior Union movements would trump any supposed
advantage the Confederates had. At Stones River, the Army of Tennessee was
beaten because Bragg assumed that he had won, though he had only pushed
the Union Army back. During the entire war the lack of enemy pursuit often came
back to haunt those who believed they had won. For Bragg, this was why he and
his army were unsuccessful at Stones River. If Bragg had continued his attack
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against Rosecrans instead of letting him fortify and reinforce his position, then
the Confederacy would have stood a better chance at victory.
After Stones River the Army of Tennessee retreated into the town of
Winchester. In his accounts of the Battle of Stones River, Bragg blamed much of
the loss on his subordinates. According to his accounts, “The Failure of MajorGeneral McCown to execute during the night an order for a slight change in the
line of his division, and which had to be done the next morning, caused some
delay in the general and vigorous assault by Lieutenant-General Hardee.”50 It is
important to note that Bragg does not blame the entire loss on his subordinates,
but rather shows their inability to execute orders cost them a victory. The failure
to execute orders plagued the Army of Tennessee and cost them dearly. Bragg’s
subordinates disobeyed him because they were trying to make him look bad. He
believed that some sought to acquire his position, while others were simply
covering their own mistakes. He was correct in both assumptions. Bragg states
that his reasoning for retreating from Stones River was necessary in order to
save his army. He felt that to fight another day, the army needed to survive and
retreat to a better defensive location, especially, since the Union had become so
well fortified and reinforced.51
If the Battle for Chattanooga signaled the end of the Confederacy, the loss
at Stones River was the beginning of that end. Stones River was not the opening
Bragg or any of the Confederate leaders had hoped. It is interesting though that
despite the loss, Bragg was still confident and believed the army accomplished
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more than they had lost. He listed the capture of prisoners and artillery pieces as
positives, while also noting that during the battle Nathan Bedford Forrest and his
cavalry were successful in raids into Western Kentucky. This is interesting
because one would believe the extra fighting force of Forrest and his men would
have been greatly welcomed by Bragg and his men. Instead Bragg justifies the
absence of Forrest. This is because of the success of Forrest’s raid in West
Tennessee and North Kentucky.52
The Chattanooga Campaign started with the Battle of Stones River, and
the importance of this loss can not be underestimated. This battle set up the rest
of the campaign. After Stones River, Bragg and his army knew exactly how
quickly the Union Army could reinforce and supply itself. They gained a complete
understanding of what they were up against, and this began to make Bragg a
little nervous. The campaign was one of the most important for the Confederacy
during the entire war, but they were unable to hold their initial position in
Tennessee and slowly relinquished the rest of the state one part at a time. They
blew their chance at stopping the Union.
When it became overwhelmingly evident that the Confederate Army stood
little chance against the Union, Bragg and his staff decided that it was in their
best interest to retreat and abandon Murfreesboro. In doing so they gave up
seventeen-hundred wounded and sick men, along with medical personnel. By
mid-afternoon on January 3 the Confederate Army began pulling out of
Murfreesboro. In another example of poor leadership, Bragg had not planned for
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a retreat and thus had no idea exactly to where his army would be retreating. Not
planning a retreat was not uncommon during the war, but most of the time
generals had an idea of what their next moves were to be in multiple scenarios.
Bragg did not plan appropriately and it was evident in his actions when the
decision to retreat was made. Despite this lapse, the army ultimately decided to
retreat into the Shelbyville area.53
Shortly after arriving in Shelbyville, Bragg decided that it was best to push
onto Winchester and form a defensive line along the Duck River. The Army of
Tennessee held this position for six months. During this time the army
established headquarters at Winchester, Tullahoma, and Shelbyville. The army
spent their time here drilling and bolstering its ranks in preparation for the Union’s
attack. During the encampment along the Duck River the dissatisfaction of
Bragg’s actions came about again. Bragg was being judged and scrutinized for
his actions at Murfreesboro which caused him to call a meeting with his
commanders and discuss the retreat from Murfreesboro. Bragg stated that if the
accusations that he was not supported were true, he would retire as commander.
The commanders concluded that, “Under existing circumstances the general
interest required that Gen. Bragg ask to be relieved.”54 Bragg then asked each
general to provide written proof that they had supported the retreat. Hardee’s
response was that while he supported the retreat, Bragg should still be removed.
Hardee was no longer holding back his discontent for Bragg. The inactivity
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allowed them plenty of time for this, and Bragg did not help himself with his
inaction and uncertainty either.55
While the Confederate Army was encamped along the Duck River,
Rosecrans and the Union Army entered Murfreesboro and began making it their
headquarters. The Union was busy establishing supply lines and entrenching
themselves within the city, while planing their next move. Rosecrans was trying
to find the best possible way to confront Bragg and his army. A full frontal attack
at Shelbyville did not seem the wisest choice, so Rosecrans decided to look to
the gaps between the mountains. He considered using Bell Buckle or Liberty’s
Gap, which would bring him squarely into contact with Hardee’s division. His
other options were to go around the Confederate Army, but this would take more
time and be far from the reach of railroads. President Lincoln prodded Rosecrans
to take action, but Rosecrans felt that he needed additional time. Like McClellan,
Rosecrans did not take action until he felt it was the right time.56
It was not until June that Rosecrans and the Union Army made their
advance on the Confederate line. Rosecrans waited for what he considered the
right time to attack. Bragg could do nothing but wait for an attack because of his
placement of troops. There were a couple of problems with this strategy. First the
positions held along the Duck River by the Southern army made for a poor
defensive line. Bragg had stretched his already thin army too much, while also
sending troops to Mississippi, weakening them even more. In all his planning,
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Bragg had not picked the strongest of defensive lines. The biggest area for
concern for Bragg was his right flank, which could be flanked by routes from
McMinnville through the Cumberland Mountains or by way of Manchester and
Hoover’s Gap. Because of these poor defensive positions, the Confederate Army
was really unable to stand a chance against Rosecrans and the advancing Union
Army.57
Though the six months spent along the Duck River had their advantages,
they did cause some major holes to appear in the Army of Tennessee. These
included the resurgence of the anti-Bragg coalition and the demoralization of the
soldiers. The inactivity during these six months led to restlessness and
resentment from the soldiers. Even the newspapers began criticizing Bragg. The
Chattanooga Rebel was one of the hardest on Bragg. It reported trouble for the
army just three days after the Battle of Stones River. The paper heavily criticized
Bragg, stating that he was not popular within the army, he had alienated his
officers, and that his own troops felt no affection or confidence towards him. One
of the biggest criticisms of Bragg was the retreat from Murfreesboro where the
paper stated he retreated, “against the advice of his general officers.”58 Articles
like this made Bragg even more paranoid and convinced him of the need to rid
the army of the anti-Bragg faction. What he did not understand was that it had
already spread too far.59
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Each of the issues presented to Bragg represented another obstacle for
the Confederacy to overcome. As the war went on it became increasingly evident
that the South was just not ready for a war of this magnitude. They lacked proper
armaments, industry, mills, population, and support. In many ways the South was
not unified enough for the war.60 This was obvious in army divisions like the Army
of Tennessee, where soldiers were starving and leadership qualities were
questionable at best. During these critical times the Confederacy crumbled under
the pressure they faced. It was not one large issue that brought the Confederacy
to their knees, but rather a culmination of small ones. The year 1863 marked the
beginning of the end for the South and much of it was due to their own failures.
The size of Rosecrans’ army concerned Bragg the most. He believed that
Rosecrans had an army of nearly 70,000 strong, it was only 56,000, but Bragg’s
own army was only some 30,000 strong and spread out along the Duck River
from Wartrace to Columbia, fifty miles apart. The capability for Rosecrans to
quickly reinforce himself was also worrisome to Bragg. General Buell was located
in Nashville, just under sixty miles from the line established along the Duck River.
Rosecrans had the ability to add additional troops within a day. The Army of
Tennessee did not have this luxury, and Bragg had been petitioning Richmond
for additional troops for months. With the inability to add additional troops while
Rosecrans could, Bragg seemed to have lost his nerve to fight. He was anxious
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about the impending battle to come and felt that he needed to ask his junior
officers on their opinion.61
On June 29 Bragg called Hardee and Polk into a conference to discuss
their opinions on the best course of action. This was a poor decision for Bragg
because neither of these men believed him to be a competent leader and sought
instead, his removal. Polk was convinced that if they were to stay in their current
positions, they risked being trapped just as John C. Pemberton was currently at
Vicksburg. Polk’s immediate answer was to retreat. When Bragg asked him what
he proposed, Polk replied, “There wasn’t a moment to be lost in their retreat.”62
Hardee felt that Polk’s suggestion of retreat should be considered, but he offered
another plan as well. This plan was to station large detachments along key points
of the railroad. This was a viable option, but would deplete an army that was
already insufficient to begin with. After conferring with both men, Bragg chose to
heed the advice of Polk and retreat from the Duck River area.63
By the morning of June 30 Bragg learned of activity in his rear by Union
infantry and cavalry, part of which had been able to cut his communications with
Chattanooga. It was time for action from Bragg, and it had to happen quickly and
efficiently to not have his army destroyed or captured. Bragg’s intelligence
discovered a Federal column advancing from Manchester. This Union advance
was coming along the north bank of the Duck River and sought to take control of
bridges at Bethpage and Estill Springs. At this point that Bragg ordered Joseph
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Wheeler to find out what Rosecrans’ left flank was doing. Bragg ordered Wheeler
to do this because he was left in the dark about this part of his enemy’s actions.64
During this time the Union Army was designing their plan for their assault
on the Confederate line at Elk River. Rosecrans’ basic plan was to render the
Rebel entrenchments useless and secure their line of retreat if possible, while
driving them from their entrenchments onto ground more suitable to the Union.
The Union Army was going to do this by feinting an attack towards Shelbyville,
but actually attack from Manchester. From June 25-30, Union troops had
successfully deceived the Confederate Army and established themselves in
Manchester. From here the Union Army began to advance on the Confederate
positions along the river.65
By mid-afternoon on June 30 Bragg believed that he was no match for
Rosecrans and the advancing Union Army. This, in large part, could be seen as
his loss of nerve, but most likely came from his corps of commanders who
believed that their best option was to retreat. Polk suggested a retreat to the city
of Cowan and to make a stand there at the base of the mountain. At 3:00 p.m. on
June 30 Bragg gave the official orders to retreat from their positions along the
river at nightfall. The order came exactly twenty-four hours after his initial
meeting with Polk and Hardee. Had Bragg and his men elected to stay, they
would have been met by the advancing Cumberland Army the next day, but
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instead they chose to flee. If the army could not have beaten the Union here,
they stood little chance to do so in any other area they fought.66
Because the Army of Tennessee were so well entrenched in the area,
they should have stood a respectable chance at beating the Army of the
Cumberland. They were easily outflanked by the Union Army, but did not retreat
into a better area for defense. The Army of Tennessee was well enough
entrenched and fortified along the river that this was easily one of their best
chances to turn the campaign in their favor, but they failed to do so. The
Southern army gave up their best position of the entire campaign, and if they
could not win here, they might as well give up.
By the morning of July 1, the Army of Tennessee was headed
southeastward in retreat. Bragg had decided to fall back from Tullahoma, across
the Elk River some eight miles away. Not until nightfall was the entirety of
Bragg’s army was across the Elk River, due in large part to the poor conditions of
the roads. After crossing the river, the Army of Tennessee quickly established
their line. Hardee was to hold the right at Bethpage Bridge and Polk the left at
Allisonia Bridge. This new line was hastily established and Bragg knew he must
fight here or continue to fall back to a better area. Soon enough he realized that
he must continue on past Elk River. The river would be able to be forded by
Rosecrans at numerous locations, which would allow Hardee’s right side to be
easily flanked. Bragg decided to continue his retreat after realizing this.67
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Elk River was not falling as quickly as Bragg believed it would, which
slowed Rosecrans’ army significantly from their already sluggish pace. Had
Bragg and his commanders foreseen this, it is reasonable to suspect they could
have made a successful stand at Elk River. This was not to be the case though
and the Army of Tennessee continued to push on after their short stay.
By this time Bragg had lost nearly half of Middle and Eastern Tennessee
to the Union without much of a fight. To the Confederate government, and his
own generals, it seemed as though Bragg was just giving up. This began to
infuriate those that had put so much trust in him. To them, their commander was
beginning to finally show his true colors. The importance of this campaign was
evident to those around it, but it seemed as if they were doing little to win it. They
had already given up wounded soldiers, supplies, and valuable land to the
advancing Union Army, and could not afford to give up any more. Looking at this
campaign from a historical view, it is evident that by late June 1863 there was
little to nothing that the Army of Tennessee could do to stop the advancing Army
of the Cumberland, and their commanders were certainly not going to help their
cause.
In the morning hours of July 2 Bragg gave the order to retreat from the Elk
River into the town of Cowan, which sits at the base of the Cumberland
Mountains. Throughout the night of July 1 and even into July 2, Bragg constantly
questioned his decision and changed his mind a few times. One of these
changes came at dawn when Bragg ordered the army to stop at Decherd, but
shortly after he changed his mind back to the original plan and continued on to

Cowan.68 How could they possibly trust a man who did not even trust his own
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opinions?
Upon reaching Cowan, it became evident that staying there was not the
final plan. Bragg began giving the orders for a further retreat shortly after
reaching the town. This time their aim was Chattanooga. When Hardee and Polk
advised a retreat from Elk River, it was their understanding that they were only
retreating to Cowan where the army would make a stand, but this was not to be
their final stop. Shortly after arriving in Cowan, Bragg gave the order for further
retreat into Chattanooga. Bragg’s reasoning for the retreat to Chattanooga was
this, “We were now back against the mountains, in a country affording us
nothing, with a long line of railroad to protect, and half a dozen passes on the
right and left by which our rear could be gained. In this position it was perfectly
practicable for the enemy to destroy our means of crossing the Tennessee, and
thus secure our ultimate destruction without a battle. Having failed to bring him to
that issue, so much desired by myself and troops, I reluctantly yielded to the
necessity imposed by my position and inferior strength, and put the army in
motion for the Tennessee River.”69
At this point Bragg had given up Middle Tennessee with hardly a fight.
After he decided to retreat to Chattanooga, Bragg gave the government his
reasoning by explaining that at Cowan his back was to the mountains, he had
short rations, and he could not force Rosecrans to attack him. While the first two
were a little true, the last was clearly to make himself look better. Often Bragg
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had run from a fight against Rosecrans and he hid behind excuses so that he
would not look bad.70
When looking at Bragg’s reasoning for retreating further to Chattanooga, it
becomes clear that he was only justifying his actions and that these were merely
excuses. By the early afternoon of July 2, Rosecrans was bearing down upon
Bragg. He had already crossed the Elk River and rooted Wheeler’s division away
from Allisonia. The Union Army was able to do this by crossing the river just
downstream from the Confederates location. Bragg was witnessing the first hand
the loss of valuable territory and he continually made excuses to justify his
actions.
Cowan was the preferred location to retreat for Polk and Hardee after Elk
River, because they believed that it offered a good location for fighting. Writing to
General William Mackall, Polk said, “In reply to your question, shall we fight on
the Elk or take post on the mountain near to Cowan, I say take post near the
mountain at Cowan. I think as many trains as possible should be sent over the
mountain.”71 Polk believed that this was the best place for their defense. The
routes to Cowan would funnel the Union troops into the town and offered the
Army of Tennessee a prime location to fight. Also the town had two good routes
of retreat by way of University Place through the mountain or heading south
through the Crow Creek Valley, should things go ill for the Southern army. This
was just as good a location for fighting as the Confederate Army was going to
find in the area. Like Duck River before, if the army could not make a proper
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stand here, then it might as well surrender. Polk and Hardee wholeheartedly
believed that Bragg planed to fight at Cowan and that is why they suggested a
retreat in the first place. They were wrong and the army would not stop retreating
until it reached Chattanooga.72
The order to retreat to Chattanooga was given quickly. Bragg simply
decided that a retreat was their best plan, without discussing it with his fellow
officers. The orders simply stated, “It is ordered by General Bragg that you move
your corps to Chattanooga without delay,” in a correspondence between General
Mackall and General Polk.73 It was becoming increasingly clear to them that their
leader had no plans to fight, and that he was quickly running out of area to retreat
to. Much of this his commanders could be held responsible for, but regardless
Bragg should have fought before he reached Chattanooga. The last thing his
corps commanders, or the Confederate government, wanted was for them to be
backed into Chattanooga. This was a vital city, and as such the Army of
Tennessee should have stopped the Army of the Cumberland well beforehand.74
During a war the last thing an army, or country for that matter, wants is for
the enemy to be at the door of important cities. The army should stop the enemy
troops before they reach the city, because once they are there it is too late. Once
the Union caught up with the Confederate Army at Chattanooga all they had to
do was put the city under siege. This was exactly what the Confederacy wished
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to avoid. They did not want and could not afford another situation like Vicksburg,
having the Confederate Army would once again be under siege. The
Confederate government did not want Bragg to retreat to Chattanooga, and
neither did his commanders. If they were going to stop Rosecrans and the Army
of the Cumberland, they had to do so before Chattanooga.
By July 4 the Army of Tennessee had reached the Tennessee River and
slowly began crossing it and entering Chattanooga, which sits in the bend of the
river just below Lookout Mountain. Though Bragg’s army had made it to the town
relatively unscathed, they had also made a key mistake in their retreat. When
retreating from Cowan, Bragg forget to order Wheeler to destroy the Nashville
and Chattanooga Railroad. There was a lot of confusion in the orders Bragg gave
during the retreat. Repeatedly Wheeler, Polk, Cheatham, and Hardee had to wait
extended periods of time for orders, and many of the time those orders were
unclear. This helped lead to the roads to the city not being properly blocked. The
tunnel through the mountain was left untouched as they retreated as well. By not
destroying these key railroad lines Bragg allowed Rosecrans a relatively easy
approach to Chattanooga. They had destroyed some minor bridges, but the
important ones were left alone. This is another clear error in leadership. Had
Bragg ordered these routes destroyed, he would have bought himself critical time
in which to better prepare for the approaching army.75
As the campaign wore on, Bragg continually made critical errors such as
the ones mentioned above. The main problem with these errors was the timing of
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them. Continually Bragg gave up valuable goods, soldiers, and land. Many
leaders had to do this during the war, but most put up a better fight about it.
Bragg gave up these crucial items with hardly a fight, which is different from most
other leaders during the war. The most crucial error Bragg made was bringing
the enemy to the doorstep of one of the last important cities in Tennessee held
by the Confederacy. A siege of another important city was the last thing any
leader wanted, and yet Bragg had set himself up for it. Most other commanders
in the war avoided sieges, but Bragg seemed to welcome them. Chattanooga
was a major rail hub and industry center that the Confederacy could not afford to
give up, especially after the losses at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. By retreating to
the city, he had essentially brought the hungry wolves to his door.
The first weeks of July were a trying time for the Confederacy. By this time
the losses at Gettysburg and Vicksburg had demoralized their country and had
allowed for the complete focus in the Western theater on the Army of Tennessee.
Throughout the campaign so far, the only thing that had slowed Rosecrans’
advancing army was rain and mud. The Army of Tennessee had abandoned
several well fortified positions and eventually brought the fight to Chattanooga.

Chapter 2: Retreat to Chattanooga and North Georgia
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One problem Bragg faced throughout his tenure as commander of the
Army of Tennessee were his corps commanders. These men, led by William
Hardee and Leonidas Polk, did not see Bragg as fit to lead the army and sought
to remove him. They did this by any means necessary, and at times even took
steps that were detrimental to the Confederacy. By the time the army reached
Chattanooga, Hardee and Polk were more than ready to oust their commander.
Prior to retreating to Chattanooga Bragg’s officers had already stated their belief
that he needed to be relieved. General Hardee was the most outspoken one,
calling for Bragg’s removal by name.76
For Hardee and Polk suggesting that Bragg retreat into Chattanooga only
helped further their agenda. Neither of them believed that Bragg was competent
to run the Army of Tennessee. There had been anti-Bragg sentiment earlier but it
was really during the six months encamped along the river that those against
Bragg gained an even stronger foothold in the army. In their accounts of the
Battle at Stones River both Polk and Hardee made sure to illustrate the
incompetence of their leader. This occurred before the encampment along Duck
River. According to Hardee’s correspondence with Bragg on January 12, 1863,
“In reference to the retreat, you state that the movement from Murfreesboro was
resisted by you for some time, after advised by your corps and division
commanders. No mention of Retreat was made to me until early morning of the
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consult all of his generals in discussing the retreat. This made Bragg look
incompetent, which was what Hardee wanted.
Shortly after Hardee and Polk advised Bragg to retreat, Hardee wrote Polk
a note in which he seriously considered overthrowing Bragg and taking command
of the army. Hardee wrote, “I have been thinking seriously of the condition of this
army. What shall we do? What is Best to be done to save this army and its
honor? I think we ought to counsel together. Where is Buckner?”78 It is clear that
many of the corps commanders in the Army of Tennessee did not trust Bragg
and wanted him gone. Bragg only added fuel to the fire by ordering his army to
retreat. This time it was going to take more than the Confederate Government to
keep his commanders in line.
It is important to understand that the feelings against Bragg spread farther
than Hardee and Polk. Other corps commanders, such as Benjamin Cheatham,
Patrick Cleburne, and John Breckenridge, were also unhappy with Bragg’s
leadership. What made their plans against Bragg so effective, was that Bragg did
not fully understand who was against him. One of their ways to make Bragg look
bad was to ignore his orders. Polk and Hardee were especially good at this.
While the army was visited by Jefferson Davis’ aide-de-camp, William Preston
Johnston, Polk and Hardee told him that the army had lost faith in Bragg.
Johnston was the son of Albert Sidney Johnston, a friend of President Davis, and
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was close to both Bragg and Polk. His relationship with both Bragg and Polk led
to a report that did not properly indicate the true trouble the army was in.79
Throughout the war, Bragg was saved by those who favored him. The
events above are a prime example. Bragg was friends with or supported by many
in the Confederate government and this continually helped his military career.
This favoritism also led to tensions within his command. To Polk, Hardee, and
others, Bragg was not competent to lead. They believed that he was making
mistakes, which cost the Confederacy, the relinquishing of Middle and Eastern
Tennessee being the most recent mistake.
As the campaign progressed, the anti-Bragg faction took greater steps to
try to remove Bragg. By writing to the Confederate government, disobeying
orders, and having secret meetings, these corps commanders were able to
hinder the progress of the army. That is what is so confusing. One might not like
their leader, but to win a campaign, let alone a war, everyone has to work
together. In the Army of Tennessee this was not the case. There was so much
dissension and disloyalty, that the army could not function. It is easy to blame
Bragg, because he failed in crucial situations, but many of his mishaps were due
to his subordinate officers disobeying him. For the Army of Tennessee the
disloyalty and leadership issues were only beginning. In just a few more weeks
the leadership problems would reach an apex with the arrival of James
Longstreet and his division.
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In late July and early August 1863 Bragg and the Army of Tennessee
withdrew into the town of Chattanooga. It was here that the General hoped to
bolster his army again and be able to hold off Rosecrans. Bragg was not the only
one petitioning the Confederate government for more troops. Leonidas Polk also
wrote James Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of War, asking for more
available troops. On July 26 Polk requested use of Buckner’s troops. These extra
men would put the Army of Tennessee at an estimated strength of 70,000 to
80,000, and would allow them to move upon Rosecrans. Polk sought to
recapture the lost territory and drive the Union Army out of the area. These were
farfetched ideas, but they convey the attitude that the Army of Tennessee
needed more men and needed to go on the offensive rather than sit and wait for
Rosecrans to attack.80
After driving the Confederacy from their line at Duck River, Rosecrans and
the Union Army were gathering their strength for offensive operations to begin in
late August. At this time the Union Army had an estimated strength of 60,000 to
70,000 men, making Polk’s request for more troops even more important.
Rosecrans made his base in the Cowan-Decherd area while waiting to strike
Chattanooga. From this point the Federal troops could attack the Rebels from
multiple points. Rosecrans had his sights on taking the city.81
Chattanooga seemed a prime defensive location for Bragg and his army
due to the terrain. The city was surrounded by mountains and there were few
large roads by which an army could travel that entered the town. Both the main
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front of the Cumberland Mountains and Walden’s ridge protected the city, which
also lay on the Tennessee River. These natural barriers into the city led Bragg
and the army to believe that Chattanooga would make for the perfect defensive
area. To his west, Bragg had Sand, Lookout, Missionary Ridge, Pigeon and
Taylor’s Ridge protecting his left flank and offering little in viable roads usable by
the Union.
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City of Chattanooga82
At first glance Chattanooga seemed like an impregnable defensive
position for the Army of Tennessee, but due to the layout of the terrain it was
open to a wide frontal assault by Rosecrans. From their base in the CowanDecherd area, the Union Army could move on the Confederate position and
break their lines, while remaining relatively the same distance from their base.
The entire front resembled a triangle with the base being Rosecrans advancing.
This allowed the Union to approach from various fronts without greatly distancing
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themselves from their supply line. Bragg had little knowledge of how and where
the Union troops would advance. His approach was still precarious, but
Rosecrans had multiple options in how the army would advance. This made
Chattanooga less impervious than was initially believed.83
The most important objective for the Army of Tennessee during their time
in Chattanooga was their reinforcement. By the time Bragg’s army had entered
the city, they were facing a foe that was between 60,000 to 70,000, while the
Army of Tennessee were under 40,000. Until this point Bragg and Polk believed
that the addition of Johnston’s troops would allow for an offensive against the
Union. On August 2 Bragg wrote of Johnston’s troops possibly joining him, “With
the most of his force, if I correctly estimate them, I should look for success if a
fight can be had on equal terms.”84 At this point Bragg and his commanders were
optimistic about the addition of troops and making an offensive against
Rosecrans. Their optimism would only last a short time though, until word from
Hardee informed them that Johnston’s army was smaller than anticipated.
By August 5, Bragg again wrote Richmond, but this time he informed them
of their impossible goal. Bragg stated that it was unsafe to attack Rosecrans in
his current position because of the lack of troops available. Even with the
addition of Johnston and Buckner’s troops, the Army of Tennessee could only
muster 40,000. Rosecrans had 60,000 readily available men, with an additional
30,000 more if needed with Burnside returning to Kentucky from Mississippi. With
the disparity in numbers, Bragg believed that it would be rash to attack the Union.
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To Bragg, all the enemy had to do was, “avoid battle for a short time and starve
us out.”85 Upon receiving Bragg’s message, President Davis agreed. Davis wrote
to Secretary of War Seddon, “However desirable a movement may be, it is never
safe to do more than suggest it to a commanding general, and it would be unwise
to order its execution by one who foretold failure.”86 At this point Bragg’s strategy
had to change, he now had to prepare for a defensive fight.
July through early September saw the Confederate occupation of
Chattanooga becoming more and more inept. The tensions between the generals
still flared and the entire Confederate department in Eastern Tennessee was in
shambles. By August 21 it seemed as if the Union Army was coming from
everywhere. Rosecrans was beginning to make his move on the city. On the
morning of August 21 Rosecrans stationed two divisions of Thomas’ corps near
Battle Creek, and part of his cavalry had beaten Forrest's men back to
Yankeetown and Kingston. He had gained a foothold closer to Chattanooga.
Rosecrans had still not officially decided where his army would cross the
Tennessee River, but he was looking below Bridgeport, where the Confederacy
would not expect.87
Chattanooga could not be held if Rosecrans could gain a strong foothold
across the Tennessee River. Bragg knew this and yet he did little to protect the
bank from Yankee occupation. All the Union needed to do was station a small
force on Walden’s ridge and from there bombard the city. In this position there
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was little the Confederate Army could do. Bragg knew this but did little to stop it.
He conceded the river crossings west of the city. Two of these crossings, Kelly’s
and Alley’s ferries, were the most opportune places for the Union to cross the
river. By late August both of these crossings stood unguarded and just
downstream from Bridgeport, and the ferries at Stevenson were not picketed.
This was done even though Bragg knew that Rosecrans had repaired the route
to Stevenson.88
Rosecrans began making his move on Chattanooga and on August 29
had began crossing the river at Bridgeport and several other points just west of
town. Bragg gained knowledge of these crossings but paid little attention to them,
believing that Rosecrans was still northeast of the city. One of the reasons for
this poor intelligence was the lack of cavalry. Bragg had no cavalry covering his
front and barely 500 guarding along the river, making him virtually blind to
Rosecrans’ movements. Poor placement of troops and lack of quality leaders had
again cost the Army of Tennessee. On August 31 it was reported that the Union
was crossing the river at Caperton’s ferry near Stevenson. With little to no
resistance, the Federal troops were able to move over Sand and Lookout
Mountain.89
Rosecrans was not the only Union commander to be making a move in
Tennessee at the time. General Burnside was also advancing into the state from
Kentucky. With much regret Bragg ordered Buckner back to Hiwassee. Buckner’s
small force was no match for Burnside and risked being cut up if engaged in this
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position. In his letter to Richmond, Bragg acknowledges his poor offensive
position. He could not afford to leave his communication and supply lines, which
made him a sitting duck for the Union Army. Still, Bragg sought to bring the
enemy to an engagement that favored him and spare no effort to beat him. Davis
replied to this by agreeing with Bragg and suggesting that they attack the weaker
of the advancing armies first, and once they are conquered going after the
second branch. In the meantime though he suggested Bragg try to operate
against Rosecrans’ communications line.90
Rosecrans was now focusing on Bragg’s weak left flank, where Bragg had
placed Buckner and Forrest. On September 7 President Davis was informed that
Burnside was in Knoxville and Rosecrans was just beyond the mountains and
approaching cautiously towards the city.91 By September 9 the Union Army had
taken Bragg’s left and rear, while threatening his communications. Bragg feared
the loss of communication and was willing to sacrifice the city to keep them.92
There had been a turnout of civilians from Georgia to help fight against the
Yankees, but even with them Bragg and the Army of Tennessee stood little
chance. Bragg had improperly placed his men and had poor intelligence of
Rosecrans movements. The Army of Tennessee stood little chance because of
these problems.93
When Bragg and the Army of Tennessee retired into Chattanooga, it was
because it offered superior protection, food stores, supply and rail lines, and
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good communications lines. To the outside observer Chattanooga was an
impenetrable city that was protected by mountains and rivers, but, if improperly
defended, it could easily be taken. The lack of organization and the disunion
between leaders, again cost the army valuable men, supplies, and territory.
Bragg was on the brink of again having to retreat due to improper tactics.
Jefferson Davis wrote Bragg on September 8 persuading him not to give
up the Cumberland Gap. Davis knew it was important for the army to hold the
area and he could not afford Bragg giving it up. Davis acknowledged that
Rosecrans planned to force Bragg to evacuate Chattanooga, but he requested
that he not. He wanted Bragg to fight Rosecrans. In his letter, Davis punched
holes in Bragg’s argument of retreating from Chattanooga due to Rosecrans’
superior force. He suggests sending a force against Burnside and keeping him
from joining Rosecrans. Davis stated, “Your dispatch has been considered; the
position of Rosecrans and your opinion of his purpose indicates his plan to be to
cause you to evacuate Chattanooga and then make his junction with Burnside.
Your success must depend upon fighting the enemy in detail. If you cannot strike
Rosecrans because of intervening mountains and distance, do not these reasons
enable you to detach a sufficient force to crush the small army with which you
report Burnside to have advanced to Knoxville and Loudon? This suggestion is
based on your report.”94 Bragg wanted to retreat but Davis wanted him to fight,
and used his own reports against him.95
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Davis’ appeal to Bragg to fight was to no avail, and by September 9 Bragg
was preparing to leave Chattanooga. He had come to the realization that
Rosecrans was in a superior position and that his army stood little chance in their
current state. Bragg and the Army of Tennessee began to abandon the town and
would never again occupy it. On September 11 Bragg wrote from Dalton,
Georgia that the Union Army had entered Chattanooga and had easily overtaken
the small garrison he left behind. Bragg’s next plan was to find proper supplies
for his army in North Georgia, and begin to ascertain what Rosecrans’ next steps
were.96
Like Murfreesboro, Cowan, Duck and Elk River, and the rest of Eastern
and Middle Tennessee, Chattanooga was now in the possession of the Union.
The city was just the last in line to fall due to Bragg’s poor defensive strategy. At
this point the general had little confidence in himself and placed what little he still
had in the wrong men. Polk still led a strong anti-Bragg faction within the army,
and within a short amount of time General James Longstreet’s division would join
them and cause even more chaos for Bragg. Losing Chattanooga to the Union
Army was the biggest mistake of the entire campaign. Now the Union controlled
one of the last railway and industrial towns in the South. They had also now
broken through the Appalachian Mountains and were ready to strike into the
Confederate underbelly. From this point on there was little Bragg or any
Confederate leader could do to turn back Rosecrans.
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The retreat from Chattanooga lead the Army of Tennessee into the
mountains and foothills of North Georgia on the La Fayette Road. Here they
spent the next couple of weeks scouring the Georgia countryside looking for
Rosecrans. Eventually the two armies found each other at the Battle of
Chickamauga, but first they spent time in complete blindness as to where their
enemy was.97
North Georgia, like Eastern Tennessee, contains part of the Appalachian
Mountain chain and is thickly covered in woodland. There are not many routes
through these mountains and with all the underbrush in the woods, it is often
hard to see far distances. The roads were very steep and rough, which made it
difficult to move an army. One of the first goals of the advancing Union Army was
to better the roads to make travel easier for themselves and those to come.
According to Union reports the small Confederate divisions that remained in the
vicinity of Chattanooga were timid, “The enemy attempted an ambuscade at the
cross-roads, but was frightened off by an effort I was making to get into his
rear.”98 These factors played a critical role in the first couple of days after the
Confederate retreat. As Bragg’s army retreated into North Georgia, General
Thomas and his division were in pursuit.99
The route the Union Army sought to pursue the Rebels was by way of
McLemore’s Cove. They made their way through gaps in the foothills and
mountains that littered the terrain. These gaps included Dug Gap, Cooper’s Gap,
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Blue Bird Gap, and Catlett’s Gap. Bragg’s army was located in La Fayette, which
there were three main entrances into. The goal for the Southern army was to
plug these gaps and not allow the Union through. This was easier said than
done. At the beginning Bragg had little idea of what to do. His cavalry was spread
out, from Dalton to LaFayette, and there were many unclear reports as to the
actual movements being made by the Union Army. It was not until September 9
that Bragg finally began to understand the situation he was in. If he did not act
fast he stood a good chance of being trapped on his route of retreat.100
By noon on the ninth, Bragg had received intelligence that placed the
Federal troops in Will’s Valley. The reports were mixed about the strength of the
enemy, but gave a clear indication that this was the route they were taking. The
Union Army was reported to have anywhere from 4,000 to 40,000 men in the
area. Because he was getting mixed reports and had no idea until noon of the
actual Union location, Bragg could not give orders to attack. He could only give
orders to protect gaps and the Confederate rear.101
Once the Union movements became clearer to Bragg, he began plotting
how they would entrap the pursuing Union Army. The plan was for General
Thomas Hindman to take his division to Worthen’s Gap on Pigeon Mountain, and
then work southward towards the cove until he reached Davis’ crossroads. While
this was happening, General Cleburne was to take his division of Hill’s corps
through Dug Gap and across Pigeon Mountain, meeting up with Hindman at the
crossroads. From here the two divisions would join to attack the Union Army that
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was believed to be at the base of Lookout Mountain. There was trouble from the
beginning with this plan. Hindman had left headquarters and covered the first half
of the distance to his goal, but at roughly four miles away he stalled. Hindman
had heard the gaps were blocked and waited until he heard from the other
division.102

Mclemore’s Cove103
The other hinderance came when the courier carrying the orders from
Bragg had trouble finding Hill. He did not receive his orders until five hours after
they had been given, and upon receiving them gave numerous reasons as to
why they could not be followed. This cost the army precious time and is just
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another prime example of poor leadership and how they did not obey Bragg’s
orders. Due to Hill’s complaints, Bragg then ordered Buckner’s corps to move
instead of Hill. This delayed the army further, and only helped the Union to gain
more ground in pursuit.104
By September 10 the Union Army was on the road to Rome, Georgia and
was simply overpowering the smaller Confederate Army who was in desperate
need of reinforcements. Reports were being sent to Bragg of the Union Army
located in Steven’s Gap towards the Davis’ Crossroads, as well as in Dug Gap.
They were reported to have a strength of 11,000 by civilians in the area.
Hindman discussed this with Buckner and Anderson and they believed the best
course of action was to fall back to Catlett’s Gap towards La Fayette.105 The fear
of the Union Army had cost the Army of Tennessee again by causing its leaders
not to move. It was becoming imperative that the Confederate Army stop the
advancing Federal troops. If they were unable to do so soon, the Union would
overtake the Army of Tennessee and the deep South would be open to them.
As September wore on, the Army of Tennessee’s problems only
increased. The lack of obedience from Hindman and Hill had kept the army from
slowing or stopping the enemy’s advance. The Army of Tennessee was now in a
bind. Bragg had little idea of the exact movements of the Union Army, in large
part due to his dispersed cavalry, and his leaders were not obeying orders. He
and the army were in desperate need of reinforcements and better leadership.

104
105

Connelly, 177-178
Official Records XXX pt.4, 634-636

60

They would get the extra troops soon enough, but with them came more
problems for Bragg’s command.
Part of the problem for Bragg was Hindman, who continually refused to
follow the general’s orders on the tenth through the eleventh. The rest of Bragg’s
orders were contingent on waiting for Hindman’s attack. The attack did not come
until thirteen hours after the initial orders for it were given. The commands sent to
Hindman were vague and did not directly order an attack, and allowed Hindman
to do as he pleased or felt was right, instead of what was ordered. The orders
stated, “General Bragg orders you to attack and force your way through the
enemy to this point at the earliest hour that you can see him in the morning
Cleburne will attack in front the moment your guns are heard.”106 Hindman
continually called for a meetings with Cleburne and the other generals involved in
the attack around Pigeon Mountain, and they agreed with Hindman to disregard
Bragg’s orders and seek a different area for the assault. It was not until thirteen
hours after receiving Bragg’s dispatch that Hindman finally ordered the advance
on the word from scouts that said the Federals were retreating towards Steven’s
Gap.107
Bragg did not know if Thomas’ entire division was located in McLemore’s
Cove, but he was insistent on entrapping those who were there. The basic plan
was for him to trap Thomas in the cove by plugging up the gaps that surrounded
it. Polk, Hindman, and Cleburne’s division were to move to the cove through Dug
Gap, Rock Spring, and Catlett’s Gap. Though he was experiencing resistance
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from his subordinates, Bragg was also hesitant to making the attack on
McLemore’s Cove. His hesitation came from not fully understanding where
Rosecrans was and what his movements were. All Bragg was certain of was that
Crittenden’s division was separate from Rosecrans. This was why on the
eleventh Bragg and his men spent much of the day waiting on Hindman’s attack
that came later than ordered.108
Bragg and his subordinates were frantically writing Richmond asking for
more troops. They knew that Rosecrans army greatly outnumbered theirs, and if
they were to stand a chance, they needed more men. Samuel Jones wrote the
Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon stating, “I cannot too strongly
express my conviction of the importance of having additional troops in this
section of country.”109 Jones felt that there were not enough troops in Eastern
Tennessee and those that were there did not meet the requirements they needed
to stand against the Union. Jones felt that the men he had could not hold his
position. Though Jones was located north of Chattanooga his plea for more
troops was for the entire part of Eastern Tennessee. Without them it would be a
one sided fight. On September 13 General Joseph Johnston indicated troops
from Virginia were on there way.110
On the afternoon of September 11 a division of Crittenden’s corps reached
Lee and Gordon’s Mill along the Chickamauga creek. General Frank Robinson
tried to stop their advance, but was unsuccessful in doing so. By 3 a.m. he was
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forced to retreat from the north bank of the creek. At this point Bragg’s plans for
the assault changed and he focused now on Lee and Gordon’s Mill rather than
McLemore’s Cove. Bragg sought to capture this lone division, just as he had
Thomas’ at the Cove. He ordered generals Cheatham, Hindman, and Walker to
proceed to the mill by the Gordon Mill’s, Pea Vine, and Ringgold roads. The
attack was to begin as soon as possible and would start from the left wing. This
time Bragg was looking to do what he failed to at the cove, but without the
hindrance from Hindman.111
The morning of September 13 Polk began advancing towards Lee and
Gordon’s Mill looking for the enemy. Cheatham’s division skirmished with the
Union troops shortly after noon but it was only a minor engagement. Later in the
afternoon it was discovered and confirmed that Crittenden’s division had escaped
the trap Bragg tried to set. His escape can be attested to the hesitance that
Bragg had, and also to the poor defense along the Pea Vine Road by which they
escaped. This was the second time in a week that Bragg tried to trap a Union
division and failed. His best opportunities to attack Rosecrans divided army had
both been squandered. From this point on Bragg would have to face the full
strength of Rosecrans army, not just a small division.112
This was the last time the Confederate and Union Armies engaged until
the Battle of Chickamauga five days later. On September 14 and 15 Bragg
reported little to no encounters with the enemy. His reports indicate that even
though the Confederate Army sought out the enemy, they were nowhere to be
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found and retired before any engagement could begin. Bragg was trying to make
himself look better than he was at this point. He failed to properly strike when he
had the opportunity, and now was making it seem as if he was seeking an enemy
that was running from him. He later indicated that his goal was to turn them back
to Chattanooga. Bragg would shortly find out that his opportunity to do this would
come sooner than later.113
Throughout early September Bragg continually failed the Confederacy.
First he relinquished Chattanooga, one of the last key cities in the Confederacy,
to the Union with hardly a fight. Secondly he had squandered the opportunities
that had presented themselves to him as a divided Union Army, not once but
twice. His subordinates were again causing much of the problems for Bragg, but
he had little option other than these men. Part of Bragg’s problem were his lack
of troops. Rosecrans army greatly outnumbered his and he desperately needed
reinforcements. These extra troops would arrive just in time for the Battle of
Chickamauga.
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Chapter 4: Chickamauga and Siege of Chattanooga

On September 19-20 the Confederate and Union Armies fought what was
to become the bloodiest two days of the entire American Civil War. Between the
two days, this North Georgia battlefield became the final resting place for 35,000
individuals. Much of the battle raged around Chickamauga Creek, which in
Cherokee means “river of blood,” and on those two days it was just that. The
battle was a great victory for the Confederacy, also their last, and would turn
Rosecrans advancing army back to Chattanooga. For a brief moment the hopes
of the South were once again rejuvenated, but that would be short lived.
Chickamauga was a resounding defeat for the Union, and would ultimately cost
Rosecrans his job. Until this point the Union Army had handily defeated the
Confederates at every turn, and now it was the Confederacy’s turn to taste
victory.
On September 18 the Union Army was spread throughout North Georgia,
located at Lee and Gordon’s Mill, Glass’s Mill, and part still near McLemore’s
Cove. On the 18th skirmishing began between Rebel infantry and cavalry and
Union General Wood located at Gordon’s Mill. Bragg was focusing on the Union
left at Gordon’s and Reed’s Mills located between Gordon’s Mill and Ringgold. It
was unclear to the Union if the Confederacy planned on attacking their left with
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great force or if this was some feint to trick them. Orders for the Union
commanders were for them to hold their ground and prepare for an assault.114
Until the 18th Bragg’s orders for the army were to stay in place, until it
became clear to him exactly where the Union Army was located. The initial plans
for the day were for General Walker’s division to move to Alexander’s Bridge and
cross the Chickamauga, General Buckner was to move on Thedford’s Ford and
cross the creek there, General Polk was ordered to engage the enemy at
Gordon’s Mill, and General Pegram’s cavalry would cover the front. Bragg
ordered these to start at 6:30 A.M. On the night of the 18th Buckner was located
just across the river and had briefly skirmished with the Union before the
retreated, while General D.H. Hill found Owen’s Ford abandoned by the Union
and was anticipating a large attack the next morning.115
All along the Chickamauga Creek there was small skirmishing between
the two armies. According to the reports Bragg was receiving, the Union had
successfully retreated from their position but where expected to make a counter
assault the next day. Much of the skirmishing was done by the Confederate
cavalry, because of their ability to scatter and move quickly. Buckner and other
generals did not want to scatter their divisions, but rather concentrate them in
anticipation for the next days events. At the end of the day Bragg’s orders to
Wheeler were to protect the left flank. He was not sure exactly where the Union
would attack the next day and wanted to make sure his left flank was properly
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defended.116 After the previous failures, Bragg wanted to ensure that he took the
proper steps for a victory. He was getting his army ready for one of the roughest
battles of the war.
By midday on September 18, many of the Union pickets along the creek
had been driven back. Thanks to prisoners and civilians it was ascertained that
the Union camp was located opposite Owen’s Ford. After learning this Bragg
began to focus even more of his army on the left where he anticipated much of
the fighting to take place. General Hill was to take his place on Polk’s left, while
Wheeler was ordered behind Hill’s division and to protect the left flank. The
cavalry was protecting the troop movements.117
After a day full of skirmishing and many movements, it was clear that the
coming day would include a major battle between the two armies. Along the
creek the soldiers camped and waited for the next days fight. Though the night

was cold, few fires were allowed. The night was eerie and the wind blew, making
it for a ominous night for what was to come.118
The Battle of Chickamauga began at roughly 10 a.m. when the
Confederate Army attacked the Union left. Rosecrans positioned his troops so
that Crittenden was concentrated around Lee and Gordon’s Mill, General
Thomas was spread from Negley south at Crawfish Springs, Reynolds was
located to his north at the Widow Glen’s house, Baird’s division was located in
Kelly’s Field to the north, and Brannan was farther north yet. Rosecrans ordered
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General Johnson to the left in assistance to General Thomas. When he learned
of the focused attack on his left. By noon Rosecrans had ordered Thomas to
form a line from northwest to southeast, hugging the mountain and protecting his
right. Rosecrans was anticipating that Bragg would try to turn Thomas on his left
by the Ringgold Road.119
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Battle of Chickamauga Morning September 19120
By 11:30 a.m. Union troops received news that General John S.
Starkweather and Colonel Benjamin Scribner were attacked by surprise.
Starkweather and Scribner’s divisions were located south of the other federal
units and their attack meant that the Confederate troops were now behind the
120
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Union. Men from both of the divisions scrambled away in the hopes of not being
killed or captured. Four hundred men from Scribner’s division surrendered, and
the Confederate Army were also able to capture the Union field hospital and its
wounded. The disorganization of this particular instance is a prime example of
the nature of the Battle of Chickamauga. The smoke, underbrush, and overall
lack of organization made this one of the most hectic battles of the war.121
The battle began to shift to the right during the middle of the afternoon on
the nineteenth. Around 1 p.m. Brock Field, located between the Winfrey and
George Brotherton House, began to see heavy action. Rosecrans began moving
his available troops to support his right. He ordered General McCook to move
two of Sheridan’s brigades to the right and leave just one at Gordon’s Mill. The
Brock Field was becoming the heated center of the battle, where the Union and
Confederates fought a confused fight, with both gaining little advantage. Later in
the afternoon the heavy action shifted from the Brock Filed northeast into the
Winfrey Field.122
Action was heating up in the Viniard Field at the same time as it was in the
Winfrey Field. In Viniard field the fighting between the Confederate and Union
Armies was intense. It was similar to the fighting in the Brock Field. Both armies
fought and struggled with one another, but neither gained anything substantial.
The two armies fought for two hours, but by 5:30 p.m. the Union Army still held
the western edge of the field. The Confederates had failed to fully dislodge their
enemy. To the west of the Viniard Field, the two armies fought against one
121
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another around the Brotherton House. Initially this area of combat was like the
Brock and Viniard Fields, but eventually the Union troops gave way to the waves
of Confederate attacks. One by one the Federal units collapsed as the
Confederates advanced towards the La Fayette Road.123
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Battle of Chickamauga Late Afternoon September 19124
Late in the evening, around 6 p.m., one of the last attacks of the day took
place in the Winfrey Field. Union brigades of Baldwin, Willich, and Dodge took on
the Confederate brigades of Col. James Deshler, General Lucius Polk, and
Sterling Wood. In the dwindling daylight the Confederates marched across the
124
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field and attacked the Union troops located in the woods. The fighting was
intense and the soldiers could barely see through the smoke and dark. The
fighting in the Winfrey Field late on the 19th was considered by many to be some
of the fiercest fighting in all the Western arena. The Confederate attack began to
falter as the fighting went on. Eventually the two sides retired for the night with
little gained.125
The first day at Chickamauga was intense and confusing. Neither side
could claim an advantage over the other. At the end of the first day both sides
began taking care of the day’s wounded and preparing for another round of battle
to come the next day. General Thomas had his men build log breastworks
around Kelly’s Field. Around midnight Thomas and the other Union commanders
were summoned to Rosecrans’ headquarters for a meeting about the day’s
events and what their next move was. General Thomas urged the abandonment
of the right side and focus on the left. Rosecrans heeded Thomas’ idea but only a
little. The Union right was only moved back ever so slightly. If they had fallen any
further back the Union would have given up their field hospitals at Crawfish
Springs and their current headquarters. Rosecrans did not want to do either, so
he only pulled his right back slightly. The largest fear for the Union that night was
the reinforcement of Confederate troops by General James Longstreet’s division,
which were on their way. Currently the two armies were equally matched with
60,000 to 62,500 soldiers fighting for either side. Rosecrans knew that
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Longstreet’s additional 17,000 troops could mean disaster for the Union. As the
night wore on the Union rested and prepared for the coming fight.126
As the Union were reinforcing and moving their line, the Confederates
were waiting for Longstreet’s reinforcements to arrive. By 11 p.m. all of Bragg’s
army had finally crossed onto the western bank of the Chickamauga Creek.
Bragg’s army now had its back to the Chickamauga with a three mile defensive
line stretching from Reed’s Bridge on the north to Lee and Gordon’s Mill on the
south. During the night Bragg reorganized his army into two wings. One was
commanded by Polk and the other by Longstreet. The right wing, under Polk,
consisted of Cheatham’s division, Walker’s reserve corps, and Hill’s corps. The
left, Longstreet’s wing, was made up of Buckner’s corps, Hindman’s division, and
Polk’s corps. The problem with the reorganization, even though organization was
desperately needed, was that Longstreet would not arrive to the battlefield until
midnight and he was expected to lead an attack at dawn. He also knew little of
the terrain. The Confederate Army lay in wait for the coming battle cold and half
asleep, listening to the cries of the wounded and sounds of trees being cut down
by the Federals.127
The second day’s fighting began around 9:30 a.m. instead of at dawn as
had been ordered. The dawn attack had been postponed due to blunders made
by both Polk and Hill. General Hill could not be found and got the orders late, and
Polk seemed more concerned with his breakfast than beginning the attack.
Shortly before 10:00 a.m. Breckinridge’s three brigades began moving towards
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the La Fayette Road. They came square into contact with General Absolom
Baird’s division and the fighting began. Fighting around the McDonald house
began as General Daniel Adam’s troops began firing upon the Illinois men that
surrounded the house. Heated battle began in Kelly’s Field where the Union
troops had erected the log earthworks the night before. Late in the morning
Rosecrans was losing control of the situation. The main Confederate attack was
happening all along the Union left and General Thomas was in need of
reinforcements. Rosecrans ordered the withdrawal of troops on the right to be
sent in support of Thomas. Those on the right were to spare as many men as
possible to support the left.128
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Battle of Chickamauga Morning September 20129
At 10:45 a.m. General Rosecrans committed his biggest blunder of the
entire war. Rosecrans had been told that the right of General Joseph J. Reynolds
was exposed leaving him susceptible to attack. The general then ordered
Brigadier-General Wood to close on Reynolds as fast as he could. Wood, who
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had been scolded by Rosecrans before for not immediately following an order,
began to withdraw his division and move to help Reynolds. Rosecrans ordered
Wood to move his men to plug a hole that did not exist. Ironically, by moving
Wood, Rosecrans actually created a hole in the Union line. The orders sent to
Wood were unclear, but Rosecrans still blamed him in his after battle report for
not understanding him. Rosecrans’ orders told Wood to “close up” on Reynolds,
but he apparently did not mean to withdraw from the line. This unclear order
changed the outcome of the battle for the Union. Wood’s movement opened the
middle of the Union line where Confederate General Longstreet was planning to
attack shortly.130
Just as Wood’s division was moving, Longstreet’s plan to attack near the
Brotherton House in the Union center was unfolding. Thousands of Confederate
soldiers poured through the newly created gap as the last of Woods men were
leaving. The charge was met with little resistance, and the Union soldiers who did
stay quickly dispersed into the woods as the Confederate charge continued their
way. The Union retreat was disorganized and panicked. Men were dropping
everything and running for their lives. The charge had been a complete success,
collapsing the southern part of the Union line.131
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Battle of Chickamauga Afternoon September 20132
The Union cause was all but lost at Chickamauga by noon and early
afternoon. Most of Rosecrans’ army, including the general himself, had began to
pull out of the area. One of the few Union divisions that remained on the
battlefield was General Thomas’. He received word from Rosecrans to pull out,
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but Thomas chose to stay and fight. By noon he began ordering the erection of
barricades on Horseshoe Ridge. It was here that General Thomas would gain his
nickname as the “Rock of Chickamauga.” On Horseshoe Ridge, also called
Snodgrass Hill, Thomas made a stand against the advancing Confederate Army
that helped protect the retreating Union troops. The Confederate assault lasted
late into the day but was never able to break through Thomas’ line, even though
Longstreet continued to put pressure on Thomas’ men. As the fighting began to
subside in the late evening, General Thomas and the last of the Union Army at
Chickamauga began their retreat back to Chattanooga.133
The victory at the Battle of Chickamauga came at a crucial time for the
South. They had just lost two important battles and desperately needed a victory
for their cause. The victory also made it seem as if Bragg was not as inept as he
was once believed to be. This was a great victory for him and the Army of
Tennessee. Bragg’s army finally turned back the advancing Union Army. Now the
defeated Union Army headed back to Chattanooga with their tails tucked
between their legs and their morale at a new low. Chickamauga had cost both
armies a combined 35,000 casualties making it the bloodiest two days of the war.
This victory came at a key moment for the Confederacy, but they would be
unable to add to it. Chickamauga would be the last major victory in the war for
the South, and was the only victory for Bragg’s army in the entire campaign.
After their defeat the Union Army retreated back to Chattanooga.
Rosecrans’ army fled from the field of battle leaving their wounded, small arms,
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and artillery. Bragg and his fellow Confederate officers were unaware of the
Union’s complete retreat to Chattanooga until the morning of September 21.
Bragg sent Forrest and his cavalry in pursuit of the enemy on the morning of the
21st. They were in pursuit on the La Fayette Road headed towards Rossville,
Georgia. Around 11:30 a.m. Forrest sent a report to Polk indicating that the
Union were cutting timber as they went and were fortifying their position. From
his place on Missionary Ridge Forrest had a complete view of Lookout Mountain,
the Tennessee River, and Chattanooga. In his message to Polk, Forrest also
insisted the Confederates move upon the Union position quickly.134
It was initially believed that the Union were retreating beyond Chattanooga
after Chickamauga. Forrest had seen trains leaving the town from his post on
Missionary Ridge and intelligence that followed offered the same belief. On
September 23 Bragg’s army began to move on Chattanooga, and when they
arrived it seemed the Union had not retreated. New reports indicated that they
had bolstered the defenses left by the Rebel Army earlier. Bragg had to decide
what his plan of attack was. He could flank the Union defense, attack the enemy
head on, or establish a siege line and starve the Union into surrender. Bragg
believed that Rosecrans’ army was larger than it was, and he learned that
General Grant’s troops were in route to Chattanooga from Vicksburg.135
On September 29 Bragg finally decided upon a strategy. He decided to
wait for the accumulation of supplies, pontoons, and transportation to cross the
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Tennessee River to attack the city. Until then he would hold the city under siege.
His army was to occupy Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, both of which
overlooked the city. Bragg made another key mistake in not occupying the valley
west of Lookout Mountain allowing for a small trickle of supplies to reach the
besieged Union Army.136
The Confederate Army was entering one of its most crucial moments. If
they could starve out Rosecrans and retake Chattanooga, they could retake the
city and continue to hold off the Union from the deep South. If they were to fail,
the Union would still maintain their hold of the city and be able to advance from it
into the deeper Southern states. This situation was not only critical for the Army
of Tennessee, but also for the entire Confederacy. The victory at Chickamauga
raised spirits within the South, but a failure at Chattanooga would again
demoralize and seal the South’s fate. Bragg needed to keep the Union from
getting supplies and reinforcements for long enough that they either left or
surrendered. Throughout the siege he dealt with hostility and disobedience from
Longstreet, Polk, and others in his high command. This disobedience eventually
cost him.
During the siege of Chattanooga the conflict between Bragg, Polk,
Longstreet, and Hardee came to a head. Here, on the banks of the Tennessee
River, the Army of Tennessee faced a near mutinous internal crises. At this time
Bragg planned to attack two of his leading generals, Polk and Hindman. Polk he
held responsible for the failure to attack at dawn on September 20, and Hindman
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he held responsible for the McLemore’s Cove incident. Like many of Bragg’s
plans, this one was ill timed. Much of the animosity towards Bragg came from
Longstreet. The reason for this, as many speculated, was that Longstreet was
after Bragg’s job. Longstreet did nothing to quell these rumors, and in fact openly
spoke of Bragg’s poor conduct at Chickamauga. He is quoted as saying, “In my
judgment our last opportunity was lost when we failed to follow the success at
Chickamauga, and capture or disperse the Union army.”137 He would openly
state what he would have done had he been in command.138
As the last days of September faded into October, the Army of Tennessee
was in full siege mode. They were entrenched around the town and stationed
above it on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Mid October brought rains
to East Tennessee that turned the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Creek valleys
into lakes of mud. This greatly decreased the amount of supplies to the Union
Army. On October 18 General Rosecrans was relieved of his duty as the
commanding general of the Army of the Cumberland. General Ulysses S. Grant
would arrive shortly and take his place as the army’s leader. The conditions
inside Chattanooga were horrendous. General Grant messaged General
Thomas, who was in charge of Chattanooga until Grant arrived, to hold the city at
all costs. Thomas replied, “I will hold the town till we starve.”139 Starve is exactly
what the Army of the Cumberland was doing inside the city. By mid-October the
Union men were on one-half rations, which were only getting smaller and
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smaller. The animals had it even worse than the men. All along the roads to
Chattanooga animal carcasses were laying about, rotting and smelling awful.140
The first order of business for Grant when he arrived in Chattanooga was
to open the so called “Cracker line.” Opening the Cracker Line allowed for much
needed supplies to make their way into the city. It was dubbed the Cracker Line
because of the food supplies that it would bring in once opened. For the siege to
properly work the Confederates hoped to keep this line from ever opening. If the
Union were able to get the needed supplies to the city, then the siege would be
over and it would only be a matter of time before the Union would be able to
break out of Chattanooga. Bragg ordered General Longstreet to place some of
his sharpshooters on the left bank of the river, between Raccoon Mountain and
Walden’s Ridge. Their goal was to keep the Union from using Halley’s Trace to
transport supplies. In his official report Longstreet indicated that he sent the
sharpshooters along with the entire command of General E.M. Law, but he only
sent two of Law’s five brigades. This came back to haunt Bragg and the Army of
Tennessee.141
Brigadier General William Farrar “Baldy” Smith was the general who found
the key to opening up of the Cracker Line. Smith arrived in Chattanooga before
Grant and immediately began looking for the perfect area to cross and open the
line. He believed the opportunity to open up the Cracker Line lay near the
eastern base of Raccoon Mountain. On October 18 General Smith discussed his
idea with Rosecrans and the two decided to go check it out the next morning.
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The following morning Rosecrans and Smith set out from Chattanooga towards
Brown’s Ferry. When they arrived the two generals spent the next hour looking
over the area. Smith liked what he saw and decided that this was the best
position for the Union to cross. The road that crossed the river ran through a gap
in the foothills and followed along Lookout Creek. Smith believed that this would
be a good strategic place to cross and establish a foothold on the other side of
the river.142
General Grant arrived in Chattanooga on October 23, 1863, taking
command of the Army of the Cumberland. The following morning Thomas, Smith,
and Grant rode to Brown’s Ferry to continue making plans for the crossing.
Shortly after noon the group returned to Chattanooga where Grant approved the
crossing site. He allowed for Smith and Thomas to do it as they saw fit.
Immediately Thomas wired General Hooker to send his corps to cross the
Tennessee River at Bridgeport. The plan was simple but dangerous. Every
available pontoon and flatboat would be used to transfer the two brigades and
three batteries of artillery from Chattanooga to Brown's Ferry nine miles away.
The movement would be done at night under the cover of the darkness. The
brigades were led by General William Hazen and John Turchin, while the three
artillery batteries would be commanded by Major John Mendenhall.143
The crossing took place on the night of October 26 and into the morning
hours of the 27. Longstreet had not properly prepared himself for any assault the
Yankees would make. He believed that the attack on Brown’s Ferry was only a
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cover for the real Union assault to take Lookout Mountain via Johnson’s Crook.
In roughly ten minutes, on the morning of October 27, the Yankee brigades had
successfully crossed the Tennessee River and taken Brown’s Ferry. They had
caught the Confederate Army by surprise and successfully opened the Cracker
Line. This was the beginning of the end of the siege of Chattanooga. The
Confederate Army no longer held the upper hand.144
Blame for the Brown’s Ferry incident could be rested solely on the
shoulders of James Longstreet who had not heeded prior warnings nor did he
place a proper defense in the area. After the incident Longstreet simply shrugged
it off and ignored several warnings about Hooker’s advancing army. By the
morning of October 28 the situation had gotten even more out of hand. Bragg
and Longstreet met atop lookout Mountain where they discussed plans for going
forward. The two came to the conclusion of a night attack on Brown’s Ferry. The
attack was nothing but a bumbling disaster. Confusion between Bragg and
Longstreet caused problems for the assault. Longstreet was uncertain on the
number of troops, and Bragg believed Longstreet was going to attack Hookers’
main force at Brown’s Ferry. Longstreet halted three miles shy of Brown’s Ferry
and waited there instead of continuing on.145
Longstreet and his men did not even reach the Lookout Valley until about
midnight at which point they found no rear guard to attack. Longstreet then
ordered for his men to round up any wagons or stragglers and he headed back to
his headquarters. Around 2:30 Longstreet received word that Law’s brigade had
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been attacked. It was a short encounter. Shortly after the encounter the
Confederate troops fell back and conceded Bridgeport to the Union. With the
failure at Bridgeport the Union had completely opened the Cracker Line. Now
nothing stood in their way to bring in much needed supplies. This loss caused the
Confederate Army to rethink its plan of siege. With the new route open across
Raccoon Mountain, the Union Army could now receive reinforcements as well as
supplies. Hooker was already in Chattanooga and General Sherman and his
army were only a short distance away. It became quickly evident that a siege
would no longer work.146
Not long after the failed Bridgeport night attack, General Longstreet and
his division were sent to Knoxville to take on General Burnside. Grant and the
Army of the Cumberland were waiting for the arrival of General Sherman before
they were to proceed with an attack on Bragg’s army. Grant wanted to attack
Bragg’s right flank and drive him from Missionary Ridge. He initially wanted to
attack on November 7, but was swayed by General Thomas and General Smith
to wait for Sherman. Grant then planned for the attack to take place on
November 21, but this also would be pushed back because Sherman’s army had
only reached Brown’s Ferry by the twentieth and a constant rain did not allow for
the attack. Grant’s assault would not take place until November 24.147
With Sherman not arriving until the twentieth, General Thomas suggested
that Hooker’s division be strengthened for an assault on Lookout Mountain. On
November 23 General Thomas set out for the fortified Confederate position that
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ran north to south and was located a mile and a half to the east. The first
engagement occurred at Orchard Knob where General Thomas and his 25,000
men easily dispersed the small Confederate pickets who were on the hill.
Thomas was successful on his first day and set his sights on Lookout Mountain
for the following day.148
During the night of November 23 General Sherman’s men began ferrying
across the Tennessee River where the river and the Chickamauga Creek met.
Sherman began by sending a boat of thirty men across and they successfully
captured the Confederate picket. Within minutes a thousand more Yankee
soldiers were crossing the river. Over the course of the next couple of hours the
number of Yankees across the river continued to grow. Ultimately Sherman spent
the night just shy of Missionary Ridge, and did not attack until the 25th.149
At 8:00 in the morning on November 24 General Hooker’s men began
their ascension of Lookout Mountain. Hooker began the attack by sending his
own Army of the Potomac division led by General Geary. The troops quickly
arrived to the Confederate pickets placed at the bottom of the mountain. It was
too cloudy for the Confederate battery on top of the mountain to help those
below, and the Confederates on the mountain were outnumbered four or five to
one. They were no match for the advancing Union Army. The Confederate Army
still made it a tough fight for the Union, with stone breastworks and holding the
high ground. As the Union Army climbed, the incline of the mountain made the
Confederate artillery ineffective because they could not be aimed low enough to
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fire at the enemy. The Confederate soldiers then began lighting the fuses on the
shells and hurling them down the mountain. They also took to throwing rocks and
anything else they got their hands on. This did nothing to slow the onslaught of
Yankee soldiers.150

Battle of Chattanooga151
By 12:15 General Geary’s command had cleared the valley below and
taken the crest of the mountain. In the process of taking the mountain the Union
Army had captured 2,000 prisoners, taken two artillery pieces, and now occupied
the white house on top of Lookout Mountain, which General W. C. Whitaker
established as his headquarters. To the east of the house the Confederate Army
was amassing under General Walthall. The General and his brigade were able to
stabilize the Confederate position atop the mountain, but were no match for the
150
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advancing Union. For the rest of the day there were small skirmishes along the
Confederate line lasting into the night. The Union Army now held the mountain
from the white house on top, to the Tennessee River below. The Confederates
only held one important strategic point now, Missionary Ridge. Around 2:00 a.m.
the Confederate Army retreated from Lookout Mountain and made their way to
Missionary Ridge.152
Losing Lookout Mountain was a significant blow to the Army of
Tennessee. They held the high ground and the rugged terrain made it difficult for
the Union soldiers to advance. For all intensive purposes there was no reason
that the South should not have been able to stop the Yankee movement. The
problem was that the Confederate forces on the mountain were already stretched
too thin. Bragg improperly placed his troops along the mountain, and had not left
enough men to defend it. Bragg had moved some of the men to Missionary
Ridge prior to the battle, which only weakened Lookout Mountain’s defenses
even more. The blunders that plagued Bragg throughout the campaign continued
at Chattanooga. He made the wrong call at the wrong time and it cost him dearly.
Now Bragg’s only chance at stoping the Union was at Missionary Ridge.
Late in the day on November 24, General Stevenson was ordered to make
his way from Lookout Mountain to Missionary Ridge. The Battle of Missionary
Ridge was the end of the Chattanooga campaign and was another failure for the
Confederacy. The only bright spot on the day were the actions of General
Cleburne, who had been called back from departing Chickamauga train station
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on the twenty-third. The Rebels established their line along the crest of the ridge
with Breckinridge, divisions of Stewart, Bate, and Anderson, along the main part
of the ridge. Hardee’s corps was located on the north side of the ridge and under
the command of Cleburne and Walker. The north end of the ridge was
Sherman’s target, which he attacked at dawn.153
Sherman’s attack did not start until mid-morning on the 25th at Tunnel Hill.
General High B. Ewing and General John M. Corse’s brigades led the attack on
the Confederate position. For the next hour Corse sent attacks forward, only to
be repelled again and again. Sherman’s attack on Tunnel Hill was unsuccessful
because of Cleburne’s strong stand. In the meantime Hooker was having his own
troubles with the Confederate left, and would not pose a real threat until late
afternoon. This allowed Bragg to focus more support to Cleburne. Sherman
continued to advance his troops on Cleburne’s position with little success. Grant
ordered support for Sherman’s troops from Howard and Baird’s divisions.
General Hooker would not make contact with the Confederate left until 3:00
thanks to the burned bridges and destroyed roads the Confederates left. Grant
became concerned about the success of the day and ordered an assault on the
middle of the Confederate line to take the rifle pits.154
The charge on the ridge was led by General Thomas’ army with the
divisions of Baird, Wood, Sheridan, and Johnson. Shortly after 3:00 six cannons
were fired, signaling the beginning of the charge. As Grant and Thomas looked
on from Orchard Knob, the Union Army charged into the rifle pits. They scattered
153
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the Confederates, and then continued to charge up the ridge. This was not
ordered by anyone and took the Union commanders by surprise. The Yankee
soldiers continued their charge up the ridge and drove the Confederates from it.
In the process, the Confederates lost 37 field guns, roughly 2,000 prisoners, and
endured heavy casualties. The charge had been a complete success after the
failures earlier in the day. Around 4 in the afternoon the entire Confederate left
had collapsed, but their right remained strong. General Cleburne continued to
stave off the attacks by Sherman’s army. After the left broke, Bragg placed the
remaining brigades on the right in support of Cleburne.155
The Confederate right held through the day and night, but the left, along
with the ridge, had been lost. At 1 a.m. the order was given to abandon the valley
at once and make their way south. The Army of Tennessee had suffered its final
defeat under the command of General Braxton Bragg and retired into the town of
Dalton, Georgia for the remainder of the year. The retreat was made by way of
Rossville and headed south. Generals Hardee and Breckenridge would begin the
march for Dalton at daylight, while General Cleburne’s division remained in
Ringgold defending the rear. Once the army was in Dalton, they were given five
days rations and allowed to rest from the previous two day’s fighting.156
The Union Army pursued Bragg to Dalton on the 26 and heavily pressed
the rear guard. Cleburne’s men had seen heavy action for the past two days, and
properly held off the advancing enemy twice. Bragg sent word to General
Johnston that he needed his help. The heavy losses they sustained on the 24th
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and 25th made it hard for Bragg’s army to hold their position without the aid of
Johnston. General Johnston established a line just three miles from Dalton in
order to help Bragg. For the next few days the armies would skirmish in and
around Ringgold and Dalton. Finally on December 2 General Johnston’s army
repelled the Union from the area.157
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Chapter 5: Conclusion

The Army of Tennessee made its winter camp in Dalton, and it was here
their failed leader was finally replaced. On December 2, 1863 General Braxton
Bragg was relieved of his command. The best description of his departure comes
from the diary of Mary Chesnut, wife of Confederate General James Chesnut,
who wrote, “The army will be relieved to get rid of him. He has a winning way of
earning everybody’s detestation.”158 The detest for Bragg had reached even the
wives and other civilians in Dixie. No one was sad to see Bragg leave, not even
his soldiers. Bragg was replaced by General Johnston shortly and the army
remained in Dalton for the remainder of 1863.159
The Chattanooga Campaign of 1863 came to a close just how it had
started, with a loss and retreat. At the beginning of the year the Confederacy held
East Tennessee, but by fall had lost all of it to the Union. This was a devastating
blow to the Confederacy because of the industrial and agricultural aspects of the
region. Now that the Confederate Army had retired to Dalton, nothing stood in the
way of the Union Army from accessing the deep South. Bragg had allowed the
Union to take much of Tennessee with hardly a fight. He continually failed at key
moments, and was detested by his corps commanders. The end of the campaign
brought his replacement as well as embarrassment to the Confederacy.
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The importance of the Chattanooga Campaign comes from the fact that
now the Union held one of the last remaining industrial and rail cities in the
South. Union troops had breeched the Appalachian Mountains and exposed the
“heart” of the South. The loss of Chattanooga fell on the heels of the losses at
Gettysburg and Vicksburg, and was the final straw for morale in the Confederacy.
After the Chattanooga Campaign it was only a matter of time before the
Confederacy folded. The South was no longer able to support a war of this
magnitude, while losing such important areas, industry, and rail lines. To
Southerners, Chattanooga was just as vital as Richmond or Atlanta. It was only
second to those two cities in the amount of rail lines it contained, and the
Confederacy could not afford to lose any more railroads. The Confederacy stood
one final chance at stopping the Union and prolonging the war, and they failed.
Their defeat in the Chattanooga Campaign was the final nail in their coffin.
From Western Kentucky to North Georgia, Bragg did not take advantage
of situations that favored him. Multiple times he failed to establish a proper
defensive line, such as at Duck and Elk River, Chattanooga, and Murfreesboro.
His ineptitudes as a leader cost the Army of Tennessee and the South crucial
victories. Throughout the campaign Bragg drew the ire of his fellow commanders
and on multiple occasions they sought to have him relieved of duty. Generals
William Hardee, Leonidas Polk, and James Longstreet believed that Bragg was a
poor leader for the army and were key members in the movement to rid the army
of him. These generals were trying to help the Army of Tennessee, but more
often than not their plans hurt the army just as much as Bragg did.
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The Chattanooga Campaign was the final for Bragg as commander of the
Army of Tennessee. It was also one of the worst executed campaigns for the
Confederacy in the war. Bragg gave up much of Middle and Eastern Tennessee
to General Rosecrans and the Army of the Cumberland with hardly a fight. The
loss of the city and the area in which it was located meant the loss of valuable
farm land, railroads, and population. All three of these the South was in short
supply. Bragg lost the confidence of his fellow officers all the way down to
Southern citizens by the end of this campaign. At the end of the campaign
morale in the Confederacy was low as a result of the losses at Gettysburg,
Vicksburg, and Chattanooga.
The Chattanooga Campaign was one of the most important campaigns
during the war. Its loss meant that the Union now had access to deeper parts of
the South than they had ever had before. General James Longstreet put it best
when he said, “The successful march of General Rosecrans army through
Georgia would virtually be the finishing stroke of the war.”160 It would be Sherman
and not Rosecrans who made the march, but regardless Longstreet understood
the importance of the Union gaining a foothold at Chattanooga and breaking
through the Appalachian Mountains. It was the beginning of the end for the
Confederacy.
Chattanooga was a city of only 2,500 people, but its importance to the
South was much more than its population. The city was an important rail hub that
was centrally located in the South. By losing it to the Union, the Confederacy lost
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their ability to transport men, supplies, and other essential war time goods to
much of the South. The city was also home to some of the South’s industry,
making it even more important. Losing a city that contained railroads and industry
would further weaken the South. They already had a limited amount of each,
which was smaller than the North’s, and by 1863 could not afford to lose any
more.
It is understood that the city of Chattanooga, and the campaign, were
important to the South, but its importance is often understated. Gettysburg,
Vicksburg, the Shenandoah Valley, and Chancellorsville often take precedence
to the Chattanooga Campaign. This campaign was just as important to the South
as the others, but garners less attention because it did not take place in Virginia.
After the loss of Chattanooga, victory for the Confederacy was out of the
question. Chattanooga was the final breaking point for the South, and after its
loss it was only a matter of time before the Confederacy folded.
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